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Master of Arts in International Affairs and Governance

Master Thesis

Involving the diaspora for development
Present and potential contribution for cooperation with SDC in the case of Tunisia

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Abstract

By transferring money, investing, founding philanthropic organizations or introducing new competences and ideas, diasporas can contribute to the development of their country of origin. Their contributions can support, complement or expand governmental development cooperation. This master thesis deals with the present and potential contribution of the Tunisian diaspora in Switzerland to the socio-economic development of Tunisia. It analyzes how the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC) is supporting these efforts and what could be done to further increase the impact on the development of Tunisia. This thesis first provides a theoretical overview of the concepts of migration and development, defines the relevant terms and discusses the numerous ways these concept are influencing each other. A theoretical framework for the engagement of diasporas is presented. Then the situation in Switzerland and Tunisia regarding international migration is analyzed, with a particular focus on the Tunisian diaspora in Switzerland and its contributions to the development of its country of origin. Finally, the present commitment of the SDC for diaspora engagement in Tunisia is discussed.

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Abbreviations

ACIM ....*Agence pour la Coopération Internationale et le développement locale en Méditerranée* (Agency for international cooperation and local development in the Mediterranean)

ADTE ....*Association tunisienne de Défense des Tunisiens à l'Étranger* (Tunisian association for the defense of Tunisians abroad)

ATTS ....*Association des Tunisiens et des Tunisiennes en Suisse* (Associations of Tunisians in Switzerland)

BFM ....*Bundesamt für Migration* (Federal Office for Migration)

BFS ....*Bundesamt für Statistik* (Federal Statistical Office)

CETUMA ....*Centre de Tunis pour la Migration et l'Asile* (Tunisian Centre for Migration and Asylum)

CHF ….................Swiss franc

CIM ....Centre for International Migration and Development

CTRS ....*Communauté Tunisienne Résidente en Suisse pour le Développement* (Tunisian Community Residing in Switzerland for Development)

CTS …................*Communauté Tunisienne en Suisse* (Tunisian Community in Switzerland)

ECOSOC ....United Nations Economic and Social Council

EEA …..................European Economic Area

EFTA ....European Free Trade Association

EPFL ....Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne

EU ....European Union

EUMC ....European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia

FDA ....French Development Agency

FDFA ....Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

FDI ....Foreign direct investment

Fedpol ….............Federal Office of Police

GDP ....Gross domestic product

GFMD ....Global Forum on Migration and Development

GIZ …..…............. *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (German Development Agency)

IDEA ....International Diaspora Engagement Alliance

IOM ....International Organization for Migration

KNOMAD ....Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development

LTTE …..…........... Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

ODA ....Official development assistance

OECD ....Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OTE ....*Office des Tunisiens a l'Etranger* (Office of Tunisians Abroad)

PKK ....Kurdistan Workers' Party

SDC ....Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

SEM …………........ *Staatssekretariat für Migration* (State Secretariat for Migration)

SERV ....Swiss Export Risk Insurance

STTT ....Swiss Tunisian Think Tank

SVP ....*Schweizerische Volkspartei* (Swiss People's Party)

TDS ....Tunisian diaspora in Switzerland

TRE …..…............People of Tunisian origin residing in Europe

TUNES ....*Tunisiens UNiversitaires En Suisse* (Tunisian Academics in Switzerland)

TYAE ....Tibetan Youth Association in Europe

UN ....United Nations

UN DESA ....United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNDP ....United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR ....United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USD ....United States Dollar

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1. Introduction

Tens of thousands of people migrate every day in order to improve their living conditions or the ones of their families. The consequences of international migration are numerous – for the migrants themselves, their families, the communities, as well as for their country of origin and their host country. Once migrants arrive at their destination, they become part of a diaspora. From their host countries, migrants can contribute in many ways to the socio-economic development of their country of origin. They may transfer money, invest, introduce new skills and ideas in their community in their country of origin or found philanthropic organizations. Diasporas can be agents of change. Often, their goals overlap with the ones of governmental development actors and they can support, complement or expand traditional development cooperation.

Last year, according to estimations by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2015), over one million migrants arrived only in Europe in the hope of finding a new home and a better life. These numbers are not expected to decrease. On the other hand, public perception might turn. It is therefore the right time to analyze the potential for development migration offers in order to make best use of the possibilities.

In an earlier practice-based project, I gained insights into the interesting subject of diaspora engagement. This master thesis deals with the contribution of diasporas to the socio-economic development of their home countries. In detail, it analyzes the present and potential contribution of the Tunisian diaspora in Switzerland (TDS) to the development of Tunisia and how the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) can support and capitalize these efforts, in order to maximize their impact. In order to do so, this thesis first provides a theoretical overview of the concepts of migration and development and discusses the numerous ways they are influencing each other. Relevant terms are clarified and put into context. An instruction guide by Agunias & Newland (2012) for the engagement of diasporas is presented. The following chapter then analyzes the situation in Switzerland and Tunisia regarding international migration. Relevant factors, contexts and policies are discussed. Special attention is given to the TDS and its contributions to the development of Tunisia. Finally, the present commitment of the SDC for diaspora engagement in Tunisia is discussed. Its strategy and actions to engage the TDS is analyzed and some suggestions for improvement are made.

At this point, the author would like to point out that in this thesis occasionally gender-specific pronouns like *he* or *she* are used. It should go without saying that these do refer to all genders to the same extent.

2. Diaspora and development – theoretical approach

For a long time, migration and development were considered as two separated areas of study. However, this separation is not always appropriate. Lately, more and more studies have come to the conclusion that these two fields should not be looked at separately due to the mutual interaction and the strong interconnection. Both are global phenomena which influence each other. Therefore, they should be treated as such, which means that they should not be analyzed in an isolated manner. Solutions to problems in these fields should be integral and potential synergies should be used. Policy makers in development and migration have started to realize that.

The first part of this section separately defines and explains the concepts, sub-concepts and relevant terms of migration and development. In a second step, the links between the two fields are shown.

2.1. Migration

Migration is a global human phenomenon and, as such, it is as old as humanity itself. Since the beginning of human life, people have always changed their living space in order to increase their opportunities to survive and their quality of living. The first humans appeared in East Africa about two million years ago, from where they spread, in the earliest migration movements, across the continent and to Eurasia (Fleagle, Shea, Grine, Baden, & Leakey, 2010, pp. 3-9). The earliest human societies were nomadic hunter-gatherer societies, in which most of the food was obtained from wild plants and animals. These societies were constantly migrating, in order to find the best hunting grounds and the food-richest areas (Marlowe, 2005). When humans became sedentary, the constant movements stopped, but people still migrated with the intention to find the optimal place to settle and live.

Due to the technological progress, migrating over large distances has become easier. With increasing globalization, worldwide migration has been growing and there is still a strong upward trend (Sutherland, 2013, p. 7). According to estimates of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA, 2010), in 2010, almost 214 million people have migrated, which was roughly equal to 3.1 % of the global population. Ten years before, 178.5 million people have migrated, and in 1990, 155.5 million, about 2.9 % of the world population at that time. Women are slightly less likely to migrate than men, counting for about 49 % of the total number of migrants. (UN DESA, 2010)

The United Nations (UN DESA, 1998), defines an international migrant as a "person who changes his or her country of usual residence". By "usual residence" they mean "the country in which the

person has a place to live where he or she normally spends the daily period of rest" (p. 9). Thereby, they distinguish migration from other movements "for purposes of recreation, holiday, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage", which are considered traveling and do "not entail a change in the country of usual residence." Furthermore, the UN DESA (1998) differentiates between long-term and short-term migrants. "A long-term migrant should be defined as a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year" (p. 10). Short-term migrants, on the other hand, change their place of residence "for a period of at least 3 months but less than a year".

Naturally, migration does not always imply crossing state borders. A mayor part of migratory movements take place within one country, which is called internal migration. According to Peter Sutherland (2013, p. 7), United Nations Special Representative for Migration, 740 million people migrated internally in 2013, which is more than three times as much as external migrants. However, this paper focuses on the latter, the so-called external or international migration.

2.1.1. Patterns of migration and relevant terms

There is a wide range of reasons why people migrate. Most theories of migration try to explain the phenomena by using rational choice models, focusing mainly on economic and demographic factors such as the labor market situation or the population development. Lee (1966) divides these factors into two groups: **push** and **pull factors**. The underlying assumption is that migration is caused by a group of factors, which drive an individual out of a given country (push factors) and a second group of factors, which attract said individual to a specific country (pull factors). As push factors, Lee considers all factors of the country of origin, which motivate an individual to emigrate. Examples would be the lack of jobs, political oppression, famine or armed conflicts. Pull factors, on the other hand, are those factors in the country of destination, which motivate the individual to immigrate, such as political stability, job opportunities, attractive climates or better living conditions in general. Migration is therefore caused by the interaction of these push and pull factors. (Lee, pp. 49-52)

While by living there, a migrant normally knows the relevant push factors in his country of origin, there is generally some uncertainty about the pull factors in his potential country of destination, because knowledge of the area of destination is seldom exact. Often, migrants rely on information given by friends or relatives who have immigrated themselves or on media reports. Therefore, they are biased in their decision-making process. Often they tend to idealize certain countries of destination before actually migrating. In addition, there are many personal factors which affect the decision to migrate. Lee (1966, p. 51) emphasizes that "personal sensitivities, intelligence, and awareness of conditions elsewhere enter into the evaluation of the situation at origin". On the other hand, "knowledge of the situation at destination depends upon personal

contacts or upon sources of information which are not universally available." Furthermore, there are personalities which are resistant to change and others which are inclined to it. Therefore, the decision to migrate is taken under imperfect information and is not entirely rational. Additionally, "not all persons who migrate reach that decision themselves". Children, for example, are carried along by their parents.

However, the decision to migrate or not is not only influenced by push and pull factors, but also by a third set of factors, which cause the direct costs of migration. Lee (1966, p. 51) calls these factors **intervening obstacles**. The most common obstacle for migration is distance; others might be immigration laws, physical barriers like fences and, naturally, the cost of transportation. Different people are affected in different ways by the same set of obstacles. What may be trivial to some people, may be prohibitive to others.

In this respect, it makes sense to distinguish between two types of migration, which generally create fundamentally different sets of intervening obstacles. Depending on the **legal status** of a migrant, which is determined by national immigration policies, the mode of travel (route, means of transport, etc.) chosen might be completely different, due to different intervening obstacles. Generally, a distinction is made between **regular** and **irregular migration**. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2011), regular or documented migration means that the migrant has "entered a country lawfully and remains in accordance the country with his or her admission criteria." Irregular migration, on the other hand, "takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries." A clear or universally accepted definition does not exist. An irregular migrant "lacks legal status in a transit or host country", "owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa". Therefore, this definition covers both, people who crossed the border illegally and people who entered a country lawfully but stayed for a longer period than authorized. According to the IOM, "the term 'irregular' is preferable to 'illegal' because the latter carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants' humanity." Other terms are clandestine or undocumented migrant.

As the thousands of irregular immigrants crossing borders every day prove, immigration law does not automatically stop immigrants. The effectiveness of immigration laws to hinder migration depends highly on the capability of states to enforce such laws and stop people from crossing a border. By doing so, state authorities create artificial barriers to increase the cost of migration. From very early history, walls were built with the purpose of detering people from crossing it, either to prevent emigration[1] or immigration[2]. However, no wall or similar barrier could ever make the crossing of a border completely impossible. But, walls and other barriers

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[1] Eg. the Berlin Wall.
[2] Eg. the Mexico-United States barrier.

function as intervening obstacles, increase the cost of migration and can therefore deter some irregular immigrants. Same applies to border patrols as well as other strategies to artificially increase the costs of migration. In the end, the illegal status alone does probably not deter people from migrating, but artificial barriers might increase the costs of migration to a point, where it can outweigh the potential benefits.

The legal status of a migrant, whether he is legally allowed to migrate to a country and stay there or not, does mainly depend on the national immigration policy, based on political, economic and security factors. Firstly, the possibility to enter a country lawfully depends on the country of origin and the specific requirements the receiving country demands for those citizens. In order to obtain a visa, migrants often need to fulfill some financial requirements, which means, they need to prove that they have sufficient financial resources to cover the duration of their stay. In addition, they must not be considered a risk to public order, domestic security or public health. Furthermore, the requirements for entering a country depend on the purpose and duration of stay. (State Secretariat for Migration (SEM), 2015a)

A migrant who does not fulfill the legal requirements to enter a country may be able to enter as **asylum seeker**, if he can credibly claim that he "seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments" (IOM, 2011). In contemporary Europe, in the discussion about migration, a distinction is made between **economic migrants** seeking a higher quality of life for themselves or their family and **refugees**, who fear for their life or bodily integrity. Unlike war, armed conflicts and political oppression, natural disasters and other emergencies such as famines are normally not considered a reason for asylum (Rüffer & Beißwenger, 2016).

Although flight from wars, armed conflicts and other catastrophes – due to the perceived imminent danger to life – is often considered the most important reason for migration, and therefore often is seen by public opinion as more urgent and legitimate than other motives, it however amounts in fact to a relatively small share of global migration. In 2010, "only" 7.6 % of the global migrants were considered refugees by the UN (UN DESA, 2010). However, this share is subject to wide fluctuations, depending on many factors like emerging conflicts or droughts and the general economic development.

Once a migrant has arrived in his country of destination, there are different legal statuses he can obtain. If he has entered unlawfully or did not stay in accordance with his condition of entry, he will be considered an irregular migrant. If he obtains a residence permit, there is usually a distinction made between (1) short-term permits, (2) long-term or residence permits and (3) permanent or settlement permits. Furthermore, there might be additional permits, for example

for asylum-seekers. These permits define the legal details of the person's stay, such as the duration, whether or not she is allowed to enter and leave the country freely during her stay and if she is allowed to work. By residing in another country than her own, the migrant becomes a **foreigner** or **alien**. (SEM, 2011)

Once a foreigner has resided a certain amount of time in a country and satisfies the necessary conditions, he can normally try to obtain this country's citizenship, which is called **naturalization**. However, there are no international rules for naturalization and the process in the different countries can be quite distinctive, defined by national citizenship laws. These laws also define the citizenship of a child of foreign parents. There are two basic concepts, *jus soli* (right of soil) and *jus sanguinis* (right of blood). In the first one, a child born within a country's territorial jurisdiction acquires said country's nationality. *Jus sanguinis* on the other hand means that a child acquires the nationality of his parents. However, many countries apply a mixture of these two principles. (IOM, 2011; SEM, 2012a)

2.1.2. Diaspora

According to Faist (2010, p. 14), there is no exact definition of the term **diaspora**. Instead, it has become an all-purpose word. The term refers to a number of transnational forms of society and cross-border processes and cannot be clearly differentiated from other concepts such as "immigrants" or "expatriates". The term originates from the Greek *diaspeirein*, which means to disperse (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016). For a long time, it was only used to describe the global Jewish community living outside of Israel. However, lately, the term has been used to explain a wide number of migration and minority phenomena. (Bruneau, 2010, p. 35)

Cohen (as cited in Esman, 2009, pp. 13-14) characterized the common features of diasporas as follows:

1. dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign regions;
2. alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade, or to further colonial ambitions;
3. a collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history, and achievements;
4. an idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety, and prosperity, even to its creation;
5. the development of a return movement that gains collective approbation;
6. a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history, and the belief in a common fate;

7.   a troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance at the least or the possibility that another calamity might befall the group;

8.   a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement; and

9.   the possibility of a distinctive, creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism.

According to Bruneau (2010, p. 35), a diaspora comes into being because of the commitment of a group to bond with another group settled elsewhere, by invoking their common identity. This bond can come in different forms, such as family, religion, socio-political and economic ties or a shared memory of a catastrophe, suffered by the members of the diaspora or their forebears. This gives the diaspora symbolic capital that enables it to reproduce and overcome the "obstacle of distance separating its communities". For the host country, the existence of a diaspora means the existence of a minority with differing degrees of integration and cultural hybridity.

Bruneau (2010, pp. 39-41) creates a typology of four diaspora-types, based on the density of their organizational structure and the amount of influence exerted by their nation of origin:

1.   A set of diasporas structured around an **entrepreneurial** or **economic** pole, where everything else is subordinated to it. Nationality or religion do not play a structuring role and there is generally a great diversity[3]. The members of the diaspora might be from different states and regions of origin[4] or without a clear national identity. The nation-state of origin does not exercise any decisive influence. Entrepreneurship constitutes the central element of the reproduction strategy of these diasporas. Examples are the Chinese or the Indian diaspora.

2.   In another set of diasporas, **religion** is the main structuring element. The most known example is the Jewish diaspora. Where nation states have been formed, in which religion is a legitimizing element (as in the case of Israel), then those states have exercised an increasingly stronger influence on these diasporas.

3.   A third and more recent set of diasporas is organized mainly around a **political** pole. This is particularly so when the territory of origin is dominated by a foreign power and the main aspiration of the diaspora population is the creation of a nation-state. An example of this is the Palestinian diaspora.

4.   The fourth set of diasporas is organized around a **racial** and **cultural** pole. Examples are African Americans or Romani people. Often, the common identity is rather vague, since

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[3] In the case of the Indian diaspora, it consists of Hindus, Muslims, Christians as well as people of other faiths (Bruneau, 2010, p. 39).

[4] For example from Hong Kong, Taiwan, mainland China and South-East Asia for the Chinese diaspora (Bruneau, 2010, p. 39).

there is in most cases no specific society or territory they can refer to and therefore no contact to the country of origin. Therefore, a common identity often mainly arises from the minority situation the groups find themselves in. The logic of cultural hybridization, which implies borrowing from the host society, comes into full play, since as mentioned, the original society does not or only vaguely exist or is disconnected from the diaspora. Often, the diaspora has a decentralized community structure and is characterized by the non-hierarchical proliferation of community segments.

As mentioned before, the term diaspora is not clear-cut. Therefore, it is not possible to identify exactly who is member of such a community and who is not. Questions, like over how many generations this status is maintained or how close the relationship to the country of origin has to be, are answered in completely different ways. Consequently, it is also a person's self-chosen identity that decides whether she is member of a diaspora or not. It has to be mentioned that a diaspora can by no means be regarded as a homogeneous group.

2.1.3. Consequences of migration

Migration has a grand variety of political, economic and societal consequences, both for the country of origin and the host country. The following section offers a short overview of the very complex consequences of migration for both countries, mainly focusing on **economic migration**.

2.1.3.1.   *Country of origin*

Firstly, the positive and negative effects of migration on the country of origin are analyzed. As mentioned, most migration movement is motivated by economic reasons and the general desire to find better living conditions. In the first place, the migrant himself can benefit from a higher salary and better working conditions, if he manages to settle in a more prosperous country. If the migrant earns more than he needs for a living, he might transfer a part of his money to people who stayed in his home country. Such a transfer is called **remittance**[5]. His family, friends or even a larger community can benefit from such a commitment, depending on the motivation and effort.

Furthermore, the migrant can also benefit in non-economic ways. For example, he might have the possibility to study or to learn new working techniques. If he later on returns to his country of origin, it might benefit from his acquired skills. The concept of **brain circulation**[6] by Xiaonan Cao (as cited in Johnson & Regets, 1998, p. 3) sees the mobility of highly talented workers as a potential for the home country, because they may return after a cycle of study and work abroad to take advantage of high-level opportunities. Also, migration can facilitate the transfer of skills

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[5] See Chapter 2.3.1.1. for detailed information on remittances and their effects.
[6] As opposed to brain drain, see below.

and technology (UN DESA, 2001, p. 99). Furthermore, migration can be seen as an opportunity to relieve a tense labor market.

According to Canuto (2011, pp. xi-xii), "there has been a shift in the discussion from seeing the emigration of skilled people as a loss, to seeing skilled migration as an opportunity to get remittances, trade, investment projects, and new knowledge." Many countries have started to tap into their diasporas as a source of knowledge.

However, there are also negative effects resulting from this phenomenon. The flight of highly qualified human capital is called **brain drain**. It entails knowledge loss, when highly skilled professionals emigrate abroad. Brain drain is "the loss […] of highly trained and often experienced individuals from their country to other nations in pursuit of higher paying jobs, as well as more conducive working environments within which to express and utilize their hard-earned specialized talent and skills" (Okeke, 2008, S. 120-121). It is in the interest of every country, to recruit qualified employees from abroad, since educating them is a costly and lengthy process. By recruiting specialists from abroad, these costs are passed on to the country of origin.[7]

This alone can be a macroeconomic problem for the country of origin, but even more alarming is that degrees and diplomas are often not recognized in other countries. In this case, not even the host country can benefit from the intellectual potential. Therefore, this situation is a loss for both, the country of origin and the host country. This phenomenon is called **brain waste**, since the hard-earned education is wasted, if a graduate will not work in his specialist field and therefore cannot exploit his maximum potential. Brain waste often has the consequence that a migrant earns less than he could, based on his qualifications. This again reduces his available income and therefore also the amount of money he can send as remittances to his home country. Furthermore, tax offices in both countries lose from this waste. (Engelmann & Müller, 2007, p. 18)

Migration can be demanding, exhausting, expensive and even dangerous. In many cases, migrants leave family members behind, which causes social costs. Migration requires resources and, as such, it is not available to everyone. The poorest people often lack the capital required to migrate. Therefore, migration can even exacerbate **economic** and **social inequalities**, because remittances may exclude the poorest people. Women more often lack the resources to migrate than men; also they can be physically more vulnerable and can be restrained in their movement by their caring and reproductive responsibilities and cultural norms (IOM, n.d.). For these and other reasons, men are more inclined to economic migration. However, this can also change the

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[7] See also next chapter.

structure of the society in the home country and, for example, help woman to become better integrated into the labor market.

2.1.3.2. Host country

Also in the host country, the effects of migration are ambiguous. According to a study by the UN DESA (2001, p. 99), "international migration can provide countries of destination with needed human resources and talent". First of all, immigration can help to solve a demographic problem common in western countries: the excessive aging of society, as a result of below-replacement fertility and increased longevity. According to the UN DESA (2001, pp. 7-10) population projections, Japan and virtually all the countries of Europe are expected to decrease in population size over the next 50 years. In addition to the decrease in population size, they are undergoing a relatively rapid ageing process. The projected population decline and population ageing will have profound and far-reaching consequences, forcing governments to reassess many established economic, social and political policies and programs, including those relating to international migration. Welfare states would become increasingly difficult to finance, if the relative number of contributors sinks and labor shortage could become a major challenge. International migration could be the solution to the declines in the size of the total population and working-age population, as well as the overall ageing of the population in highly developed countries.

As the converse phenomenon of brain drain, **brain gain** occurs when there is net-immigration of highly qualified persons (Hunger, 2003, p. 14). As mentioned before, recruiting qualified employees from abroad can be a profitable strategy, since the costs of education of specialists can be passed on to other countries. Finally, migrants contribute to the economic growth of a country. Also, most of them are tax payers, so the treasury can benefit from migration, especially in the case of well-paid specialists.

On the other hand, international migration can give rise to social tensions (UN DESA, 2001, p. 99). First of all, there might be a problem of competitiveness. Economic immigrants are often willing to work for lower wages than the local population, so there is fear of wage dumping (Cord, 2013). Also, immigrants might put additional pressure on already tense labor markets. Native people might therefore feel threatened by immigrants, since they fear losing their jobs or getting paid less.

Secondly, massive immigration can put pressure on the infrastructure. More people need housing and transportation. Prices of these goods can increase and space is a scarce commodity.

In the example of Switzerland, immigration-alarmists talk in this context of so-called *Dichte-Stress*, density stress (Daum, 2014).

Finally, immigration holds potential for cultural conflict, especially if the migrants do not become well integrated members of their host society and rather form a parallel society. Fears of *Überfremdung*, an excess of foreign cultures, probably exist, to a greater or lesser extent, in every society. Furthermore, native people might consider some specific cultures as incompatible with their own and therefore develop a rejecting attitude towards people from such cultures, as it can currently be witnessed in many European countries with the widespread prejudice against Muslims (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), 2006, pp. 108-110). These mentioned effects, together with others, can give rise to xenophobia. Negative attitudes toward immigrants, whether justifiable or not, can be exploited by nationalist political parties.

2.2. International development, development cooperation and the SDC

The concept of i**nternational development** is naturally a very wide one, consisting of a grand variety of approaches influenced by all kinds of schools of thought. Traditionally, it has been considered as largely synonymous with **economic development**, mostly measured by the gross domestic product (GDP) of a country. However, in recent years, the concept has been closer linked to the idea of **human development**, which includes an enormous variety of approaches and indices. Therefore, the focus shifted away from a mere economic view to a more complex way of looking at things, taking also factors such as health, education or equality into account.

A large number of different development actors and agencies are operating at a local, regional, national, international or global level. They differ in their financing and organizational structure, which can be private, non-governmental, governmental, inter-governmental or supra-governmental, as well as different hybrid forms (Alonso & Glennie, 2015, p. 5). The private and non-governmental actors might have all kind of different motivations for their commitment, being profit-oriented or not, religiously or ideologically motivated or simply motivated by altruism. As diverse as the countless development actors are, as varied are their focuses and approaches on the issue of development. The development organization of the UN (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2016) defines "the eradication of poverty and the reduction of inequalities and exclusion" as goal of its development efforts. Development should be sustainable and being achieved within a peaceful and democratic framework.

According to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), **development cooperation** is an "activity that aims explicitly to support national or international development priorities, is not driven by profit, discriminates in favor of developing countries, and is based on cooperative relationships that seek to enhance developing country ownership." While traditional

development aid focuses on financial and non-financial[8] transfers, the concept of development cooperation has a much broader approach. Besides transfers, it also has two other pillars: capacity support and policy change. **Capacity support** and capacity building can be seen as knowledge transfer. It means helping developing countries to help themselves, by training specialized personnel, exchanging technology and sharing policy experience. If development aid is, figuratively speaking, "giving a man a fish and feed him for a day", then capacity support is "teaching a man to fish and feed him for a lifetime". It is usually applied, when "universal basic standards of social protection" are achieved and has the objective to promote "convergence among countries' standards of living". **Policy change** refers to the efforts to change the national and international rules and structures, with the intention to make them more favorable to developing countries. "At the national level, policy change includes reviewing public policies in light of their effects on the development agenda, strengthening complementarities and avoiding conflicts among them. At international level, it implies building better enabled rules for global governance in pursuance of a more equitable distribution of development opportunities among countries and people and a more efficient provision of international public goods." (Alonso & Glennie, 2015, pp. 1-5)

The **Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)** "is Switzerland's international cooperation agency within the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA)." Together with other federal offices, the "SDC is responsible for the overall coordination of development activities […], as well as for the humanitarian aid delivered by the Swiss Confederation." The SDC considers "reducing poverty" as the goal of development cooperation, which is meant "to foster economic self-reliance and state autonomy, to contribute to the improvement of production conditions, to help in finding solutions to environmental problems, and to provide better access to education and basic healthcare services." (SDC, 2014b)

The SDC follows five strategic goals and focuses mainly on fragile and conflict-affected countries: (1) Preventing or surmounting crises, conflicts and disasters; (2) creating universal access to resources and services, (3) promoting sustainable economic growth, (4) supporting transitions to democratic, market-based economy systems, and (5) helping shape globalization that favors development, safeguards the environment and is socially acceptable. In the sense of the concept of development cooperation, the SDC does not only provide humanitarian aid, but also focuses on capacity support and policy change, amongst other things by cooperating and exchanging with different states, international organizations and other partners. (SDC, 2014c)

Switzerland is well known for its often mentioned "humanitarian tradition" (Swissinfo, 2007). Over the last decades, the budget for development cooperation has been constantly increased.

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[8] Such as food aid and the delivery of clothing (Alonso & Glennie, 2015, p. 2).

At the moment, it represents about 0.5 % of the GDP[9]. However, just like its asylum policy, the Swiss development cooperation is facing political pressure. Currently there is a debate in the Federal Assembly, wheter this contribution should be cut down. (Burri & Brotschi, 2016)

2.3. Relation between migration and development

Originally, migration and development were seen as two separated fields. Since the 1980s, considerations to link these two areas appeared (Sancar, 2007, p. 1). The basic idea was, the more developed countries invested in the reduction of poverty in developing countries, the less would be the need of migrants to leave their country. The implicit promise that a committed development policy could contribute to a reduction of immigration has been used by politicians to justify development assistance (Eichenauer, Menet, & Schlegel, 2012, pp. 12-15).

However, this logic has some serious flaws. More recent studies show that the causal relationship is much more complex. There is no clear inverse correlation between the reduction of poverty and migration. Indeed the contrary is true, at least up to a certain degree. With increasing income, migration from and inside of poor countries initially increases as well. As mentioned before, migration is costly. Migrants do usually not represent the poorest of a society. Rather, they (or their families) have an income sufficiently high to finance the journey. The poorest people in developing countries, generally the targets of development assistance, often lack the resources to migrate in the first place. Additionally, there are other reasons why development assistance can in fact stimulate migration. An example is the reduction of infant mortality as a development goal, which can cause the population to grow, what then again can lead to overpopulation, and as a consequence increases the incentives to emigrate. (Eichenauer *et al.*, 2012, pp. 19-23)

However, not only are there complex causal relationships between development and migration, the causal relation goes also in the other direction. Migration offers a versatile potential to bolster development. According to Canuto (2011, p. xi), "the diaspora of developing countries can be a potent force for development for their countries of origin". The following sections shows how members of a diaspora can and do contribute to the development of their homeland.

2.3.1. Diaspora as an actor of development

According to the SDC (2014a), "migrants who have integrated well in their host country make a significant contribution to the development of their country of origin." Integration and commitment to one's homeland are not mutually exclusive. Often, the goals of diasporas overlap

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[9] Which is however still less than the 0.7 % the UN demands for its Millennium Development Goals (UNDP), 2006).

with the ones of private and public development actors. They may want to help their families, or have an ideological or nationalist motivation, or simply see a good business opportunity. This way, private diaspora actors can support, complement or expand classic development cooperation.

Many development agencies, including the SDC, have recognized the immense potential of diasporas. Often, diaspora members have first-hand knowledge of the development situation and the specific needs in their country of origin. This knowledge, although it can be very subjective, is valuable and often difficult to gain for foreign development workers. The SDC (2014a) acknowledges, that "members of diaspora communities move between two countries" and therefore "know the living conditions in both the countries of origin and destination." For this reason, "migrants are playing an increasingly important role in the debate regarding future development cooperation. Closer partnerships among governments, development organizations and migrants can help us to better exploit the potential benefits of migration." With so-called co-development or diaspora engagement programs, development actors try to activate and channel the commitment of diasporas for the development of their countries of origin.

Members of a diaspora can contribute to the development of their countries of origin through monetary transfers, but also in other forms, such as promotion of trade, investments, research, innovation, and knowledge and technology transfers (Canuto, 2011, p. xi). In the following, these different transfers are explained.

2.3.1.1.   Monetary transfers

Migrants often send a part of their income back to their homeland. Monetary transfers sent by migrants to individuals in their country of origin are called remittances (Hertlein & Vadean, 2006, pp. 1-3). According to the World Bank's Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD, 2016, pp. v-vi, 34), worldwide remittance flows are estimated to have exceeded 601 billion USD in 2015. Of that amount, about 441 billion USD are estimated to have flown into developing countries – nearly three times the amount of official development assistance (ODA). For many developing countries, remittances are a very important economic factor and often the largest source of foreign currency. Excluding China, remittances are an even bigger source of income than foreign direct investment (FDI). As can be seen in Figure 1, remittances have also proved to be less volatile and more crisis-resistant than other external financing flows, such as FDI. In 2008, for instance, at the peak of the global financial crisis, they fell only slightly, compared to FDI and other forms of investment. Remittances constitute therefore "reliable sources of foreign exchange earnings, and cushion households' income during bad times."

Figure 1: Remittance to developing countries versus other external financing flows (KNOMAD, 2016, p. 34).

The top recipient countries in 2015 were India, China, the Philippines, Mexico and France. As a share of GDP, Tajikistan (42 %), the Kyrgyz Republic (30 %), Nepal (29 %), Tonga (28 %), and Moldova (26 %) were the largest recipients. High-income countries are the main source of remittances. The United States is by far the largest, with an estimated 56.3 billion USD in recorded outflows in 2014. Saudi Arabia ranks second, followed by Russia, Switzerland (with 24.7 billion USD, 3.5 % of its GDP), Germany, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. (KNOMAD, 2016, pp. v-vi, 31-32)

However, it must be acknowledged that these represent only the registered transfers, but remittances are often sent through informal channels. Therefore, "the true size of remittances, including unrecorded flows through formal and informal channels, is believed to be significantly larger" (KNOMAD, 2016, p. v). Many different channels are used to send remittances. Formal channels are banks, credit institutions, exchange bureaus, post offices or other provider of financial services like Western Union or MoneyGram. There is also a grand variety of informal channels; usually they differ from country to country. Money can be delivered personally or entrusted to other migrants or transport workers, such as bus drivers, who should take it to the receipt in the country of origin. In Asia, the Hawala system is popular, a global network that permits transferring money without actually moving it, using a system of brokers, so-called *hawaladars*. Important is, that these informal channels are often based on trust and reputation and therefore do not provide the same legal security as formal services. (Hertlein & Vadean, 2006, p. 1)

Informal channels are used for various reasons. First, the transfer is often carried out more quickly than with formal services. Hawala, for example, allows an almost immediate transfer of funds, without having to register the transaction officially. It is therefore also popular to transfer monies, which proceed of illegal or illicit activities. Further, it is also suspected of being used to facilitate money laundering and to finance terrorism. Also, "unregistered channels are often

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pursued, either because undocumented immigrants generally do not have access to banks, or because many developing countries lack nationwide banking networks, making it difficult to transfer money to outlying areas." Finally, a reason for relying on informal transfer channels is the generally lower transaction cost. "Money transfers via Hawala cost the remitter a mere 1 to 2 % of the transaction sum, whereas banks charge an average of 7 %, and Western Union up to 12 %, in the form of commission or fees." (Hertlein & Vadean, 2006, p. 1)

The amount of money remitted is determined by different factors. According to Hertlein & Vadean (2006, p. 2), the duration of a migrant's stay abroad matters. "Temporary migrants who leave their families in the country of origin tend to remit the highest sums relative to their incomes." Permanent emigrants, on the other hand, generally migrate with their family members. "Over time, they have less and less contact to remaining relatives at home, which gradually results in reduced remittances." Also the residency permit status influences the amount remitted; legal residents generally send more money than undocumented ones. "However, this increase in remittances declines again as the migrants integrate themselves into the host society."

As we could see, remittances provide a dependable and consistent way of income for many developing countries and an important source of revenue in countless households. What are the macroeconomic effects? According to Hertlein & Vadean (2006, p. 4), "opinions vary greatly as to how remittances affect the fight against poverty, income distribution, spending habits, education, health, investment and growth as well as the balance of payments in developing countries." The influence of remittances on individual recipient household incomes is certainly positive, at least in the short term. An important advantage of remittances is that they are paid directly to individuals and families. No money gets lost in bureaucracies and the recipients can decide independently what to spend it on, according to their needs. In many cases, remittances have proven to have a positive effect on the community. As example, they can cause a decline in child labor and reduce the likelihood that children quit school early, improving therefore education. Furthermore, remittances can have a very positive and sustainable effect if they are invested and, for example, used to create a business. However, it is important to consider that remittances present a source of private capital, and the use of the money is not necessarily sustainable and might not coincide with the goals of development agencies.[10] Remittances play a different role in each country, depending on the given economic situation. (Hertlein & Vadean, pp. 4-7)

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[10] See chapter 2.3.1.4.

2.3.1.2. Material transfers

Besides remittances, migrants can also transfer goods, for example clothes, to their country of origin. Since they are difficult to measure, material transfers are often ignored by scholars. However, according to Libercier & Schneider (1996, p. 33), their value can in some cases even exceed the value of monetary transfers. Their influence should therefore not be underestimated.

However, material transfers hold the risk of negative spillover effects, since the forwarded goods might substitute local products. An often mentioned example for this problem is the transfer of old clothes, which is in this context criticized for weakening the local textile industry. However, the actual impact of this practice is disputed. (Kiener, 1997, p. 10)

2.3.1.3. Non-economic transfers

Besides monetary and material transfers, immaterial and non-economic transfers play an important role in the promotion of development. Diasporas are important networks for the international exchange of contacts, knowledge and technology; often, they act as gatekeepers between their host and home countries. They promote commerce between the countries and they can act as consultants for business and investment opportunities, reducing the transaction costs. From this exchange, both countries can benefit. (Canuto, 2011, p. xi; Hertlein & Vadean, 2006, p. 1)

Furthermore, as mentioned before, circular migration can create, at a minimum, the potential for increased knowledge exchange, if not even gain (brain circulation) (Hertlein & Vadean, 2006, p. 1). Migrants might benefit from studying and working abroad and bring their acquired skills back to their country of origin. Also, it is possible that migrants benefit from the cultural exchange and bring new and (hopefully) progressive values and ideals back. Ideally, it could influence the mentality and political culture in their home country, if migrants after their return become more politically engaged and for example speak out for social justice or gender equality (Libercier & Schneider, 1996, p. 34).

In this context, the concept of social remittances is important. According to Levitt (1998, p. 927), "social remittances are the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities." They have the potential to promote development and business in the country of origin and, for example, change gender roles or the attitude toward education. However, the ideas and skills diaspora groups transmit differ a lot, depending on the socio-cultural context of both, the host country and country of origin, and they can also have a negative effect. (Levitt & Lamba-Nieves, 2010)

2.3.1.4.   Potential for development and risks

As mentioned, the goals of diasporas often overlap with the goals of development actors. Because of their cultural hybridity and their position between two countries, members of diasporas can take on a valuable key role. They know the specific conditions in their country of origin, often better than professional development workers, and can provide unbureaucratic, quick and efficient support. (SDC, 2014a)

Also, diasporas might safeguard the interests of oppressed or threatened minorities and help to specifically promote their development. Diaspora organizations might enable groups which are persecuted in their home countries to preserve their culture and tradition and to organize themselves politically. Examples in Switzerland are the Tamil or the Tibetan diaspora. (Moret, Efionayi, & Stants, 2007, pp. 12, 23, 111-119; Tibetan Youth Association in Europe (TYAE), n.d.)

It is important to mention that the involvement of diasporas as actor of development does not only bring benefits but might also harbor risks and unwanted effects. As mentioned, diaspora engagement is private and does not necessarily follow the same logic as ODA. There is only little control on who benefits from remittances and other transfers and in which way. It is evident that diasporas are pursuing their own interests and their contribution to development might be very biased, arbitrary or inconsistent.

First of all, there might be a problem with effectiveness. Engagement of diaspora members is generally directed to a specific community they are connected with, be it their own family, or for example members of their religion or their ethnic group. Therefore, diaspora engagement is not necessarily directed at the neediest groups of population. As mentioned by Hertlein & Vadean (2006, p. 4), there is no evidence that remittances reduce income disparities in developing countries. In some cases, they even intensify social inequality, since as mentioned before, the poorest groups of people in developing countries can often not afford to migrate and therefore remain excluded from the benefits of remittances.

Reliability, consistency and regularity of the diaspora engagement might be an issue. Other than ODA, diaspora engagement is much more a function of capability than of need. Diaspora members are limited in their contribution by their disposable income. Although, as has been proved, remittances are more stable and less dependent on the economic situation than other international capital flows, they can still be affected by economic cycles and crises, such as mass unemployment. As could be seen in Figure 1, remittances are not as consistent as ODA and might stop just then, when most needed. Also, a diaspora member's commitment to contribute might decline over time. The longer a migrant lives in his host country and the better he

becomes integrated, the lesser he identifies with his country of origin and the lesser becomes his contact to remaining relatives at home. *Secondos* normally have a much weaker connection to the country of origin than their parents and they are therefore often less inclined to contribute. (Hertlein & Vadean, 2006, p. 2; de Ferranti & Ody, 2007, p. 62)

Also, from a development perspective, the engagement of diasporas should be sustainable and macro-economically useful. It is therefore desired that remittances are spend to cover basic needs or, even better, invested. Ideally, the recipients spend the money on education or health; invest it in the community or in revenue generating business or safe it to insure themselves against social risks (Libercier & Schneider, 1996, pp. 37-38). However, studies show that in Mexico, for example, 95% of monetary remittances are spent on consumption (Hertlein & Vadean, 2006, pp. 5-6). This can also have positive multiplier effects and therefore stimulate the national economy, but often the consumer goods are imported and therefore it does not benefit the domestic industry and deteriorate the balance of trade (Eichenauer *et al.*, 2012, p. 41). Additionally, the largest expenditure target after living expenses is home and land ownership (Hertlein & Vadean, p. 5). Although this tends to have a positive effect on the construction sector, it may have some negative consequences, such as inflation, overheating of the real estate market or unsustainable construction booms. Therefore, macroeconomic problems such as trade balance deficits, inflation and weak international competitiveness might even be exacerbated by "large, unearned financial flows" (Eichenauer *et al.*, p. 41).

Also on a household level, remittances can even have negative effect on growth. According to Hertlein & Vadean (2006, p. 6), "the paradoxical phenomenon can be traced back to a change in incentives." Because of moral hazard behavior, people in this situation no longer have incentives to remain productive and become dependent on support from relatives living abroad. Therefore, transfers from abroad can cause rent-seeking and discourage independent development.

Finally, there is always a risk that an active diaspora has other political interests than the official development agencies or a hidden agenda. As mentioned, diaspora organizations can safeguard the interests of minorities. In this context, there is a considerable risk that their political goals diverge from their host countries foreign policy goals and that they (mis-)use their resources for unfavorable political objectives. In the worst case, an armed conflict could be imported into the host country, especially, if different enemy minorities settle in one country. Also, it is possible that badly integrated minorities become radicalized and become a member of a terrorist group or so-called lone wolfs, what seems to have become a threat in many countries (Boyle, 2013, p. 5). In Switzerland, special attention has to be given to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, *Tamil Tigers*). This organization was classified by the EU as terrorist group.[11] Over many years, it

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[11] In 2009, the LTTE was militarily defeated by the Sri Lanka Armed Forces (Venutti, 2012).

has exercised large influence on the local Tamil diaspora and is suspected of having forcefully recruited young militants and having financed their organization also from Switzerland, by extorting their fellow countrymen living there (Venutti, 2012). Similar allegations were also made against a youth organization of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) (Federal Office of Police (Fedpol), 2012, p. 36).

In conclusion, it seems that an engaged diaspora can make a valuable contribution to the development of its country of origin. However, diaspora engagement should be seen as an integral part of development planning. "Diasporas can bring important financial, intellectual, and social capital to the development process, but they cannot substitute for the cultivation of domestic resources — although they can contribute to this cultivation." But by no means, diaspora engagement should be seen as a replacement of traditional development assistance. Similarly, diaspora efforts cannot succeed when the basic elements of good governance are not present in the country of origin. (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 26)

### 2.3.2. Development cooperation and Diaspora – theoretical approach

Figure 2: A road map for diaspora engagement (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 24).

As mentioned, diasporas are very heterogenic. "Each diaspora has a unique set of needs and capabilities based on its historical experience and the present realities of its countries of origin and destination — and government approaches must reflect these complexities" (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 25). Diasporas and their associations are private actors with their own interests, goals and approaches. Therefore, there are no one-size-fits-all approaches for governments to engage a diaspora for development. Agunias & Newland have elaborated a four-step[12] road map, which seems suitable and is summarized briefly in this chapter.

2.3.2.1.   *Identifying goals and capacities*

In the first stage, governmental development actors should identify their development goals and the capacities they have and match with the resources of the diaspora. These goals should be seen as an integral part of development planning and they vary depending on the country and the diaspora they aim at. This should then result in a strategy in which will be decided, which channels (e.g. remittances, investment, knowledge transfer) should be activated. The goals and the resulting strategy can also be defined in a dialogue with the diaspora and the government of the country of origin, in order to increase the effectiveness and acceptance. (Agunias & Newland, 2012, pp. 25-27)

2.3.2.2.   *Getting to know the diaspora*

Due to the heterogeneity of diasporas and their agendas, interests and strategies, it is essential for governmental development actors to get to know the diaspora they want to engage, as well as its associations. "The numbers, distribution, skills, prosperity, and level of integration of diaspora groups, along with their history, will define the universe of possibilities for diaspora partnerships." This step involves comprehensive data collection, a mapping of the diaspora, compiling inventories of diaspora skills and experience, and engaging a wide range of diaspora members in an exchange in order to "understand what the diaspora has to offer, what it is willing to offer, and what it expects" in return. The establishment of a regular and open dialogue is essential in order to get on the same page and create transparency on the expectations. Differences of opinion can create challenges. "Government policies should try to reconcile — or at least understand — differing and often diverging views." (Agunias & Newland, 2012, pp. 27-29)

2.3.2.3.   *Building trust*

In order to create a successful partnership, besides a good communication, trust is essential. It is important to take decisions, whenever possible, collectively, and include as much stakeholders as possible. "Building trust with engaged diaspora populations involves acknowledging that their

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[12] These four steps do not have to be processed necessarily in that chronological order, they might as well be addressed concurrently, or steps might be skipped. There must be constant feedback among the processes and they have to be reevaluated on a regular basis. (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 23)

dual sense of belonging and their commitment to their homelands is compatible with thorough integration in the adopted country." Furthermore, diasporas should not simply be seen as cash cows, but their contribution should be acknowledged. A matching funds program, in which the government matches the contributions of migrant organizations to infrastructure projects in their communities of origin, can create additional motivation. This step also includes the creation of a welcoming environment for diaspora engagement in development activities, both in the country of origin and in the host country. A conducive and foreigner-friendly business and social environment with low entry barriers can be essential in the host country. The members of the diaspora should be as well integrated as possible, without having to deny their roots. In the country of origin on the other hand, besides from the business climate, transparent regulations, good governance and rule of law can be important for attracting diaspora engagement. Development actors can support such efforts. (Agunias & Newland, 2012, pp. 29-31, 43)

2.3.2.4.   *Mobilizing stakeholders*

An adequate institutional framework for the coordination and the support of the diaspora organizations should be created. Governmental development actors may partner with diaspora organizations and provide them with financial support or technical assistance for their projects. There are numerous forms of possible cooperation. The creation or support of platforms to facilitate diaspora involvement in development can be helpful. "Such institutions encourage the systematic sharing of ideas and information while also serving as vehicles for capacity building. In some cases, they may also evolve into operational partners for national development agencies." From their experience, most governmental development actors concluded that the most successful projects and programs were those that built on existing diaspora initiatives rather than starting a completely new initiative. (Agunias & Newland, 2012, pp. 32-35)

According to Agunias & Newland (2012, pp. 37-53), many diaspora organizations are motivated, but face several challenges when it comes to development projects. "Many diaspora groups are small and underfunded, with entirely volunteer staff, donated office space (if any), and a minimal operating budget." With the mentioned matching funds programs or cost-sharing initiatives, governmental actors could help out. Furthermore, while many diaspora organizations are good-hearted, their initiatives are often uncoordinated and rather inefficient, since they lack the necessary technical knowhow – operational knowledge and skills – to pursue development goals effectively. Their programs often lack consistency and continuity. Here again, governmental development actors can be of assistance, by providing training and offering insights into their experiences in the field, in order to help diaspora groups build capacity. Ultimately, the goal of such supportive activities is "to build up a platform or umbrella organization that represents other organizations."

Also, governmental development actors can and should support the monitoring and evaluation of diaspora projects, which is often neglected. According to Agunias & Newland (2012, pp. 40, 55), "ongoing monitoring, evaluation, and frequent adjustments should be the foundation of any program of diaspora engagement."

Agunias & Newland (2012, p. 111) identify six possible channels through which diasporas can contribute to the development of their country of origin: (1) remittances, (2) direct investments, (3) human capital transfers, (4) philanthropic contributions, (5) capital market investments, and (6) tourism. For each mechanism, they provide recommendations in order to increase their effectiveness and efficiency. It is important to notice that in order for diaspora engagement to be most effective, a mixture of actions in the host country and the country of origin should be taken. Because of its focus, this paper concentrates mainly on policies for the host country. However, development actors should always keep in mind the conditions in the target country and, if necessary, support the implementation of measures to create conditions so diaspora contributions can fall on fertile soil.

1.   **Remittances:** The remittance infrastructure should be as transparent and efficient as possible. Members of the diaspora should be informed about the different formal channels in order to create competition and transparency. Governments might rank or compare financial service provider according to criteria relevant to migrants.[13] Another way for governments to reduce transaction costs is to create remittance channels themselves or in cooperation with private partners or the receiving countries. By giving tax breaks to remittances, governments can increase the income of the targets and encourage migrants to use formal channels. Also, a widespread problem is that often the poorest members of developing countries, especially in remote areas, lack access to the financial system, so measures to increase their inclusion might be useful. (Agunias & Newland, 2012, pp. 113-122)

Although remittances are private money, governments can encourage the development of investment vehicles and financial services in order to achieve better results for development. Incentives can be created in order to encourage investing remittances more productively. (Agunias & Newland, 2012, pp. 113-129)

2.   **Direct investment:** The lack of investment is one of the biggest obstacles to achieving sustainable growth in developing countries. In order to attract diaspora investment, a

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[13] The German Development Agency (GIZ) for example has launched a website called Geld TransFair, which provides information about legal transfer channels from Germany to 33 countries (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 116).

transparent and business friendly climate has to be created. Access to relevant information should be facilitated. The creation of a "one stop shop" for learning about investment opportunities, requirements, and procedures as well as about starting businesses could be a valuable starting point for potential investors. Organizing business events, matching local entrepreneurs with their diaspora counterparts and creating international networks would allow members of the diaspora to connect with the business world of their country of origin. Furthermore, business training programs, where potential diaspora investors learn about the specific business conditions of their country of origin could be organized or supported. Also, investors could be supported financially, either in the form of matching funds or by providing loans at favorable rates. Finally, investment to infrastructure projects crucial for development, such as schools, can be promoted by creating special incentives. (Agunias & Newland, 2012, pp. 131-158)

3.   **Human capital transfer:** As mentioned, developing countries can benefit from brain circulation, when migrants bring the skills and experience acquired in their host country back to their country of origin. Furthermore, a regular exchange between the two countries can create social remittances. Members of the diaspora could be engaged as "practitioners who fill critical resource and knowledge gaps directly"; "partners who support local individuals in a long-term exchange of resources and knowledge" or as members of scientific, technical, and business networks who help developing potential research, business and investment opportunities. This can happen on basis of a short-time exchange or a permanent return of migrants. Members of the diaspora can participate as volunteers in an exchange program, being sent as contracted experts or being given other incentives. Assistance packages or other incentives can be offered to high-skilled migrants who consider returning permanently to their country of origin. (Agunias & Newland, 2012, pp. 159-170)

Members of the diaspora can also be important sources of knowledge without having to return physically to their country of origin. Research partnerships between diasporas and local actors can be sponsored in order to create an intellectual exchange. By municipal twinning arrangements, communities can be connected across national borders, in order to benefit from an exchange of practical knowledge. Finally, the creation of scientific, technical, and business networks composed of local experts and the diaspora can be supported. "Ideally, these networks offer opportunities for leading diaspora and local experts, engineers, academics, government officials, and other professionals to meet one another and discuss research, business, and investment opportunities in their homeland." (Agunias & Newland, 2012, pp. 159-186)

4.   **Philanthropic contributions:** According to Agunias & Newland (2012, pp. 187-203), private philanthropy plays an increasingly important role in development efforts. "Private

philanthropic institutions often undertake high-risk policy innovation and demonstration projects that are neither attractive to business nor feasible for government agencies." Diaspora philanthropy refers to the "private donations of diaspora populations to a wide range of causes in their countries of origin." As mentioned, their motivations, objectives, capacities, and impacts vary. "Coordination among these actors can lead to successful and sustainable development efforts." Government can support philanthropic organizations financially and/or with training. Here again, matching funds programs or cost-sharing initiatives can be interesting tools. As mentioned, it is essential for governmental development actors to set a clear agenda and priorities, since the objectives of the diaspora's organizations may not always be aligned with those of the state agency.

5.   **Capital market investments:** Capital markets are fundamental to development, as they mobilize savings for investment, providing the funds that power wealth creation. Diaspora members tend to have different perceptions of risk than non-diaspora investors, since they have access to better information and are less sensitive to exchange-rate risks. Therefore, they are an especially interesting target group and financial instruments should be created to attract their savings into investments that contribute to sustainable development. Here as well, governmental development actors can contribute best by supporting the creation of a transparent and business friendly investment climate and by helping to make vital information accessible. (Agunias & Newland, 2012, pp. 205-214)

6.   **Promotion of tourism and trade:** For many developing countries, tourism serves as a primary source of foreign exchange earnings, fuels job creation, and stimulates other sectors that are important for development. Diasporas can play an important role in opening markets for new tourism destinations as well as markets for goods produced in their countries of origin. By organizing fairs, for example, members of the diaspora can be given a space for promoting the products and tourist destinations of their country of origin. (Agunias & Newland, 2012, p. 215)

2.3.3. Development cooperation and Diaspora – international examples

Many governmental development organizations have recognized the underlying potential of diaspora organizations for development and have created special programs for diaspora engagement. This section briefly presents the focuses of the diaspora engagement programs of Switzerland, France and Germany, countries which have programs aiming at the Tunisian diaspora, as well as international and global governance initiatives.

2.3.3.1. Switzerland

The SDC (2015b) has a global program focused on migration and development, with the intention of "leveraging the potential of migration for development". This program is focused on the following six areas: (1) the international political dialogue on migration, (2) the fight against human trafficking, (3) refugees and internally displaced persons, (4) the diaspora, (5) labor migration and (6) Swiss foreign policy on migration (SDC, 2015c). It is often emphasized by SDC staff and therefore seems important to mention that the objective of the global program on migration and development is not to prevent immigration (Diallo, 2015).

The SDC (2014a) "helps migrants to contribute to sustainable development by fostering appropriate conditions in countries of origin, transit and destination. It also supports initiatives carried out by diaspora organizations." The SDC's diaspora program is based on three pillars:

1. **Improving conditions**: The SDC helps to create the necessary political, legal and social conditions to allow migrants' experience to have the largest possible impact. To this end, the SDC works closely with national and local authorities in migrants' countries of origin.
2. **Developing capabilities**: The SDC strengthens the organizational skills of members of migrant organizations, ensuring that their ideas and plans can be implemented.
3. **Working with diasporas**: The SDC establishes projects in cooperation with selected migrant organizations, in order to assess the potential for cooperation and develop various different forms of cooperation.

As part of an earlier study, the political acceptance of the diaspora engagement policy in Switzerland was analyzed. Generally speaking, most of the surveyed members of parliament welcomed the idea of an active diaspora. 64 % stated that foreigners in Switzerland should contribute increasingly to the development in their home countries. Even 82 % stated that the SDC should deepen the cooperation with diaspora organization. None of the surveyed politicians disapproved this idea. Furthermore, a majority (55 %) had the opinion that a successful cooperation between the SDC and diaspora organization could increase the acceptance of these diaspora groups. However, 64 % of the surveyed politicians disagreed with the idea that an active diaspora can replace parts of the ODA and think that it should rather be seen as a complement. All in all, it can be said that the diaspora engagement policy is widely welcomed, even by politicians and parties who are usually rather skeptical about development assistance. (Courtin, Ferroni, & Krizan, 2013, pp. 27-39)

2.3.3.2.   France

Due to its colonial past, France has a long tradition in development assistance and an active migration policy. From early on, the French Development Agency (FDA) tried to connect the two fields. However, the French approach has mostly focused on return and reintegration, while other subjects, such as circular migration or diaspora projects, were mainly absent. Since 2007 however, France's engagement in this area has gained weight. A crucial instrument of France's diaspora engagement policy has been the signature of agreements for migration flows and co-development with countries of origin, "aiming at simultaneously facilitating human mobility, encouraging temporary migration and stimulating the return of competences and investments in order to favor local development." According to Bacchi *et al.* (2013, p. 87), France is a pioneer in involving diaspora communities in its development actions. Its policy has two main priorities: the transfer of knowledge and remittances. Tunisia is one of the beneficiaries of the agreements for migration flows and co-development and one of the priority countries of French development assistance. (Bacchi *et al.*, pp. 87-93)

2.3.3.3.   Germany

In the mid-2000s, the topic of diaspora engagement entered the political agenda in Germany. In 2003, the German Development Agency (GIZ) "hosted two conferences on 'Migration and Development' in order to gain a better understanding and overview of diaspora communities in Germany and to identify opportunities for cooperation. As a result, several programs and projects were established to promote transnational activities of the migrant communities in Germany." In 2011, in cooperation with other federal agencies and ministries, the Centre for International Migration and Development (CIM) was founded, with the objective to "promote the potential of global migration for sustainable development." The CIM focuses on four areas: (1) supporting professional migrants in Germany to return to their country of origin and facilitating their economic integration, (2) supporting migrant organizations in the implementation of programs in their countries of origin by offering financial support as well as opportunities for training and networking, (3) supporting migrants who want to establish a business in their country of origin and (4) advising priority countries in the field of migration policy. (Ragab, McGregor, & Siegel, 2013, p. 17)

The CIM has several projects involving the Tunisian Diaspora. A project to promote legal mobility of highly skilled workers from Tunisia has been launched in 2012. Its aim is to "enable 100 Tunisian unemployed engineers a working stay in Germany and provide them with new professional perspectives and the opportunity to gain international experience." The participants receive German language classes before their departure and additional specialized and country-specific training in order to be prepared for their stay in Germany. Then they participate in a six-month internship, "in which participants gain work experience in German companies with the

aim of achieving long-term acquisition of employment". Another project supports Tunisian professionals in Germany who want to return to their country of origin with counseling and recruitment services as well as financial support. Participants are only supported in jobs that are relevant for development, especially engineers or computer scientists. (Ragab *et al.*, 2013, p. 28)

2.3.3.4. *Global and international initiatives*

On global level, the UN member states have founded in 2007 the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in order to overcome the national borders of development assistance. The GFMD wants to promote an exchange between policy makers and engage with other migration-stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations, experts and migrant organizations to foster practical outcomes at national, bilateral and international level; exchange good practices and experiences in order to maximize the development benefits of migration and migration flows; identify possibilities to foster synergies and greater policy coherence at national, regional and international levels between the migration and development policy areas; establish partnerships and cooperation between countries and other stakeholders, such as international organizations, diasporas, migrants, academia etc., on migration and development; and contribute to the structuring of the international agenda on migration and development. (Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), 2015)

Internationally, several non-profit organizations, such as the International Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IDEA, 2016), promote the inclusion of diasporas in development activities. Institutions such as the World Bank (2016a) have their own diaspora or migration program and contribute with research or policy recommendations.

3. A closer look at migration: Switzerland and Tunisia

In a first step, this chapter analyzes Switzerland and Tunisia from a migration standpoint. Switzerland is discussed from an immigration and Tunisia from an emigration point of view. In a next step, the Tunisian diaspora in Switzerland (TDS) is examined. The emphasis is on its present and potential contribution to the development of Tunisia.

3.1. Immigration in Switzerland

Switzerland is a popular destination for immigration; it has one of the highest per capita immigration rates in Europe. In 2000, nearly 1.5 million foreigners were residing in Switzerland, 20.5 % of the population (Efionayi, Niederberger, & Wanner, 2005). Until 2014, this share has increased to 23.8 % (SEM, 2015b, p. 7). During the 19th century, Switzerland was predominantly a country of emigration. Then it became more and more a destination for employment-seeking French, Germans, and Italians. Especially the latter were often recruited for the major infrastructure projects, such as the railroads. Until the end of the Second World War, foreigners living in Switzerland mainly originated from the neighboring countries. However, in the latter half of the 20th century, it became increasingly home to Eastern European dissidents, Yugoslavian refugees, and asylum seekers from the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. (Efionayi *et al.*)

In 2013, 167'271 people immigrating to Switzerland were registered. Most of them, 121'567, came from EU or EFTA member states. In the same year, 86'184 people were emigrating from Switzerland, so the migratory balance is positive. (Bundesamt für Migration (BFM), 2013, pp. 12-13) At the end of 2014, there were 1.95 million legally residing foreigners living in Switzerland. Of these foreigners, 1.33 million were EU/EFTA nationals. 35'186 persons were granted Swiss citizenship in that year. 23'764 persons applied for asylum in Switzerland, which are three applications per 1'000 habitants[14]. In 2014, the Swiss State Secretariat for Migration (SEM, 2015b, pp. 7, 22) handled 26'715 asylum applications at first instance and granted asylum to 6'199 asylum seekers, which corresponds to an approval rate of 25.6 %[15].

3.1.1. Pull factors

Although there may have been some shifts over the decades, the main pull factors encouraging migration to Switzerland were probably always of an economic nature. Macro-economic factors such as the very low rate of unemployment (or even labor shortage) and the high level of income should be emphasized (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2007, pp. 118-119). The high political stability, even when most surrounding countries were at war, is

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[14] The European average stood at around 1.2 asylum applications per 1'000 habitants (SEM, 2015b, p. 24).
[15] 2'504 cases were written off (SEM, 2015b, p. 22).

an additional factor. Furthermore, there might be "softer" factors like the high stage of development and the standard of living. An additional plus is the multilingual tradition, which makes integration for many immigrants easier.

It should also be mentioned, that for many migrants, especially those who are not citizens of the EU, the intervening obstacles for migrating to Switzerland are relatively high. For many reasons, migrating to Switzerland is costly. First of all, due to the high price level, the direct costs such as transport and accommodation are comparatively high. Furthermore, as will be seen in following section, the restrictive migration policy is making migration to Switzerland more difficult. However, these intervening obstacles appear not to be strong enough to outweigh the pull factors, since Switzerland is still a popular migration destination.

3.1.2. Entry requirements

Since the 1990s, Switzerland has forged closer ties with the EU, making it easier for EU citizens to live and work in Switzerland and vice versa (Efionayi *et al.*, 2005). The requirements for entry depend on the purpose and duration of stay. Swiss, EU or EEA citizens, can enter Switzerland freely by presenting a valid ID card or passport and stay without any further requirements. With introduction of the Swiss-EU/EFTA bilateral agreement on the free movement of persons, Switzerland applies a restrictive policy on immigration by third-state nationals (SEM, 2015b, p. 12). Therefore, citizens of other countries need to meet more extensive criteria to enter and can in most cases only stay for 90 days without a visa. In the case of over a hundred countries, citizens require also a visa to enter Switzerland. (SEM, 2015a)

3.1.3. Naturalization

In Switzerland, the communes and cantons are responsible for naturalization matters. The Federal Government lays down the relevant criteria. Applicants need to have lived in Switzerland for at least twelve years[16]. Additionally, the cantons and communities have their own residence requirements which applicants have to satisfy. Exceptions are made for minors and spouses of Swiss citizens. (SEM, 2012c)

With regard to children of foreign parents born on Swiss territory, Switzerland applies *jus sanguinis* (SEM, 2012a). A child born in Switzerland acquires the nationality of its parents. A common term in Switzerland for the here born, first generation of descendants of migrants is **secondo** respectively **seconda**. These terms are used, whether the person has become a Swiss citizen or not. (Maurer, 2003)

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[16] The years spent in this country between the completed 10th and 20th years are counted double for this purpose (SEM, 2012c).

The rules on naturalization are seen as relatively strict. The naturalization rate is quite low by comparison with other countries. Neither marriage with a Swiss citizen nor being born on Swiss territory confers Swiss nationality. (OECD, 2007, pp. 119-120)

3.1.4. Asylum

In the last few years, asylum applications in Switzerland and Europe were significantly affected by numerous trouble spots to the south and east of the Mediterranean and on the African continent, mainly a consequence of the so-called Arab Spring (SEM, 2015b, pp. 24-25). The responsible body for asylum applications in Switzerland is the Asylum Procedure Directorate at the SEM. This office "has to examine whether the asylum claims are credible and whether the person in question fulfils the requirements for refugee status laid down in the Asylum Act. […] Asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected have to leave Switzerland. In such cases, however, the office has to examine whether there are any obstacles to removal. Should such obstacles exist, the State Secretariat for Migration orders temporary admission to Switzerland." (SEM, 2012b)

3.1.5. Irregular Migration

Almost per definition, irregular or undocumented migrants are not recorded in official statistics. According to a number of estimates, between 70'000 and 300'000 undocumented migrants, so-called *sans-papiers*, are living in Switzerland. It is a very heterogeneous group, covering a wide range of demographic groups and different regions of origins.[17] In their majority, they are working (illicitly), law-abiding (wherever they can) and appear to be well adapted or integrated in Switzerland, since they need to avoid drawing attention. (Sans-Papiers, n.d.; SEM, 2005; Efionayi-Mäder *et al.*, 2010, pp. 7-9, 24-31)

The discriminatory treatment between EU/EFTA citizens and citizens from so-called third countries has resulted in a situation, where the former have almost the same rights as Swiss citizens, while the latter can only migrate to Switzerland under difficult conditions. This policy of opening the borders for EU/EFTA citizens while mostly locking out the rest, led to a situation, where many citizens of third countries can only migrate irregularly to Switzerland. (Efionayi-Mäder *et al.*, 2010, pp. 32-36)

The legal situation of sans-papiers in Switzerland is very complex and often contradictory. While they have no right to remain in Switzerland, they do have some universal rights, mainly deducible from the human and fundamental rights in the Swiss Federal Constitution and international conventions. However, their illegal stay makes it often impossible for them to claim

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[17] However, because of the agreement on the free movement of persons singed with EU and EFTA, almost all undocumented migrants come from so called third countries (Efionayi-Mäder *et al.*, 2010, p. 7).

their rights. Lately, the authorities seem to have adopted a pragmatic approach. There is mainly a consensus in politics that the situation is unsatisfactory, but there is no consensus about solutions in sight. (Efionayi-Mäder *et al.,* 2010, pp. 38-39)

Currently, sans-papiers have only two possibilities to legalize their legal status: marrying a legal resident of Switzerland or a so-called hardship request, for people who have lived several years in Switzerland. In the latter case, the canton has to decide about the case. There is no transparency about the criteria applied. Furthermore, by making a hardship request, a sans-papiers turns himself in and risks being deported in the case of a negative decision. Therefore, this procedure is very risky and unpopular. Even counseling centers for sans-papiers do often not recommend taking this step. (Efionayi-Mäder *et al.*, 2010, pp. 43-48) In 2014, 263 sans-papiers obtained residence permits in Switzerland as hardship cases (SEM, 2015b, p. 26).

In 2001, sans-papier groups started to lobby for a collective regularization of all irregular immigrants in Switzerland. Over a short period of time, the cause gained considerable media interest and support. However, most political actors rejected the proposal and it disappeared again from the public agenda. According to critics, the problem is mostly "trivialized" if not even "ignored" in Swiss politics and society, which might have to do with the lack of visibility of sans-papiers. Furthermore, due to the illegal nature of their stay in Switzerland, they become often (unjustly) associated with other illegal activities. (Efionayi-Mäder *et al.*, 2010, pp. 43-44, 49-51)

3.1.6. Politics and migration policy

Migration is a complex issue. In the Swiss federal administration, several different offices and units are involved with migration topics. Most importantly, the SEM (2015c) "regulates the conditions under which people can enter Switzerland in order to live and work here [and] […] decides who will receive protection from persecution." Furthermore, it "coordinates federal, cantonal and communal efforts to help foreign residents integrate into Swiss society and deals with applications for Swiss citizenship at federal level." Irregular migration and related issues like human trafficking and smuggling of migrants are a task of the Federal Office of Police (Fedpol, 2015). As mentioned, the SDC (2015b) has a global program focused on migration and development. Additional to the federal offices, several other institutions, like the aliens police, are involved on cantonal level.

Like in all of Europe, migration and topics related to migration are important political issues in Switzerland. Generally speaking, most Swiss people seem to have a rather negative attitude towards migration. The topic seems to cause worries and insecurities. In the annually released, representative survey *Sorgenbarometer* (worry barometer) by Claude Longchamp *et al.* (2015,

pp. 6-7), the topic "foreigners/refugees" is named as the "second most important problem in Switzerland", only surpassed by "unemployment". The additionally listed topic "immigration" ranks also in the top 5. 48 % of the Swiss people perceive migration and the related topics as a problem. Although these worries are not new, there is a clear upwards tendency discernible since 2009 (Longchamp *et al.*, p. 12).

These worries are dominantly represented in Swiss politics. Mostly the national-conservative Swiss People's Party (SVP) is very active and dominant in these topics. Asylum policy and policy on foreigners are the first issues appearing on the SVP's (n.d.[b]) website. The party commits itself to make asylum laws stricter and to reduce immigration. Besides the traditional political procedures, the SVP periodically makes use of the popular initiative, an instrument which allows citizens to propose changes to the Swiss Federal Constitution. Over the last 15 years, the Swiss people voted on six popular initiatives related to the migration/foreigners/asylum issue.[18] All but one[19] of them were launched directly by the SVP or committees with close ties to that party. Of these six initiatives, two were successful, which is a higher rate than usual.[20] In 2010, the Swiss electorate voted yes on an initiative ("Extradition-initiative"), which demands that foreigners lose their residence permit, if they are convicted for serious criminal offense. In 2014, they accepted an initiative ("Mass immigration-initiative"), which intends to limit immigration through quotas. (The Federal Chancellery, 2016b)

3.2. Emigration from Tunisia

According to Natter (2015) "Tunisia is, and has long been, a prime emigration country in the Mediterranean region." In 2012, from a total population of eleven million, 1.2 million Tunisians were living abroad, about 11 %. This represents a strong increase, up from 8 % in 2002. 84 % of the Tunisian expatriates live in Europe. The majority of Tunisian emigrants reside in France (55 %), followed by Italy (15 %) and Germany (7 %), as can be seen in Table 1.

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[18] In chronological order:
- "Against abuse of the right of asylum", rejected on November 24, 2002,
- "For democratic naturalization", rejected on June 1, 2008,
- "For extradition of criminal foreigners", accepted on November 28, 2010,
- "Against mass immigration", accepted on February 9, 2014,
- "Stop the overpopulation – for the safeguarding of the natural environment", rejected on November 30, 2014,
- "For the enforcement of the extradition of criminal foreigners", rejected on February 28, 2016 (The Federal Chancellery, 2016b).

[19] The so-called "Ecopop-initiative" or "Stop the overpopulation – for the safeguarding of the natural environment" was launched by the association "Ecology and Population" (Ecopop, n.d.).

[20] Additionally, the SVP has called for several referendums on migration or asylum laws. While this thesis was being written, the result of the referendum on a reform on the asylum law, called by the SVP and voted on June 5, 2016, was still unclear. (The Federal Chancellery, 2016a)

Immigration to Tunisia has been relatively low since its independence. 2014, just 0.5 % of the population was foreign, the majority coming from other Maghrebi countries. However, in the last decade, Tunisia has become increasingly popular among Sub-Saharan African migrants. Among them, there is a high number of irregular immigrants, since Tunisia has become a transit country for irregular migrants on their way to Europe. Tunisia had several agreements signed with European countries like France, in order to combat irregular migration from third countries and to readmit third country nationals who have migrated to Europe irregularly. In return, Tunisia was granted eased entry rules for its nationals. Because of the civil war in Libya in 2011 and the ongoing political instability, a great number of Libyan refugees have entered Tunisian territory. This has created some serious challenges for Tunisia's authorities and their migration and security policy, especially in connection with Islamist groups. (Natter, 2015)

Country of Residence	2002	Share of Tunisian Migrant Population (%)	2012	Share of Tunisian Migrant Population (%)
European countries	668,000	84	1,032,000	84
France	480,000	60	669,000	55
Italy	90,000	11	189,000	15
Germany	46,000	6	87,000	7
Maghreb countries	71,000	9	92,000	8
Libya	54,000	7	69,000	6
Arab countries	32,000	4	60,000	5
UAE	n.d.	n.d.	19,000	2
Saudi Arabia	n.d.	n.d.	17,000	1
Other countries	23,000	3	39,000	3
Canada	12,000	2	20,000	2
United States	9,000	1	15,000	1
Total	794,000	100	1,223,000	100

Table 1: Geographic Distribution of Tunisian Emigrants, 2002 and 2012 (Natter, 2015).

3.2.1. Push factors

For many years, Tunisia has been a comparatively stable, peaceful and progressive country. Although ruled in an authoritarian, repressive and corrupt manner, it offered its citizens a relatively broad spectrum of civil liberties, notably regarding women's rights. Trying to identify possible push factors for Tunisia, most of them seem to be of an economic nature. The structurally high unemployment rate[21] and the lack of opportunities particularly affected young university graduates and workers in economically neglected interior regions. (Natter, 2015)

Until the 1990s, Tunisian emigrants were mostly low- or semi-skilled workers or family members. However, as can be seen in Figure 3, high unemployment has become an increasing problem

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[21] In 1991: 16.8 %, in 1995: 14.5 %, in 2000: 15.7 %, in 2005: 14.2 %, in 2010: 13 %, in 2014: 13.3 % (The World Bank, 2016b).

especially among university graduates. This has led increasing numbers of tertiary-educated Tunisians to emigrate. (Natter, 2015)


Figure 3: Tunisian Unemployment Rate in Percentage of Active Population, 2004 – 14 (Natter, 2015).

A study conducted by Kriaa, El Elj, & Moussa (2013, pp. 8-10) confirms that the motivation to leave Tunisia is mainly linked to the socio-economic and financial situations of the migrants and their families. Most of the migrants were unemployed before their departure. For them, emigrating was seen as a way to "leave [their] everyday world where [they could] not satisfy [their] needs in order to go to another world where this is possible." The lack of prospects, especially after having graduated from university, seems particularly motivating for young Tunisians. Often migrating is also seen as a way of taking responsibility for the family in the absence of other perspectives. However, some migrants also mentioned different motives, such as thirst for adventure.

3.2.2. Evolution of Tunisian emigration

Since its independence in 1956, emigration from Tunisia "has been heavily dominated by labor migration to Western Europe, especially to the former colonial power, France." Later, "in the 1980s, Italy became increasingly attractive for low-skilled Tunisian workers due to its geographical proximity and the absence of immigration restrictions." After the restriction of Europe's visa regime and stronger border controls in the early 1990s, "permanent settlement, irregular entry, and overstaying became structural features of Tunisian emigration." In the recent years, "soaring unemployment among tertiary-educated youth has triggered new flows of student and high-skilled emigration, especially to Germany and North America." (Natter, 2015)

[35]

Figure 4: Evolution of Annual Tunisian Emigration to Main Western Destinations, 1965 – 2010 (Natter, 2015).

Figure 4 shows the evolution of the annual Tunisian emigration to the 15 main western destinations[22] between 1965 and the revolution in 2010. The peak between 1969 and 1973 is mostly explained by high unemployment in Tunisia and economic growth in the destination countries. The Tunisian Emigration Direction Office encouraged migration to Europe with the goal to relieve the labor market and boost the economy through remittances. Migrants were actively recruited and professionally trained and contracts with European employers were signed for Tunisian workers. In this period, "Tunisian migrants mainly worked in construction, industry, and agriculture, performing both low-skilled and specialized jobs". European countries halted recruitment of Tunisian workers in the aftermath of the oil crisis 1973, which at first made Tunisian migration drop drastically. However, in the long run, European policies to reduce the number of migrants were ineffective, mostly because labor market demand in Europe and high unemployment in Tunisia continued to provide migration incentives. "Tunisians increasingly used family and student migration channels in reaction to waning legal opportunities to migrate as workers, and overstaying visas became a common phenomenon". The right to family reunification provided new migration opportunities, so family reunification became the primary legal pathway for Tunisians to enter Europe. Also, circular migration was replaced by increasingly permanent settlement of Tunisians in European destinations. Because of stricter entry and residence requirements for Tunisians in many European countries, Tunisian migration to Europe

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[22] Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States (Natter, 2015).

became increasingly irregular. The peaks in the 1980s and 1990s correspond to regularization efforts in France and Italy at that time. (Natter, 2015)

By looking at Figure 4, it becomes clear that until the first half of the 1980s, almost all migration flows were directed to France (and, to a lesser part, to Germany). Afterwards, a diversification started and especially Italy became a popular destination, mainly due to geographic proximity and because Tunisians did not need a visa to enter Italy until 1990. Furthermore, from the mid-1970s, Tunisian labor migration partly shifted to neighboring Libya, where economic growth created employment opportunities. (Natter, 2015)

Between 2001 and 2008, the number of Tunisians living abroad rose from 764'000 to over a million. This corresponds to an annual average growth of 5.5 %, much more than Tunisia's population growth rate, which was about 1 % in the same period. (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, p. 27)

Until the so-called (second) Jasmine Revolution in 2011, which sparked the Arab Spring, Tunisia's emigration policy was determined by a close control of the emigrants. "Workers were encouraged to emigrate to stimulate the economy through remittances and relieve domestic unemployment. Meanwhile, the government closely monitored migrants, both to secure close ties with the diaspora and to dissipate political engagement and criticism of the regime from abroad." (Natter, 2015)

At the end of 2010, mass protests following the self-immolation of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi launched a revolution that culminated in the toppling of progressive but authoritarian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali on January 14, 2011. The Jasmine revolution ended the repressive and corrupt rule of President Ben Ali after 23 years in power. Subsequently, Tunisia's first free elections were held in October 2011, bringing the moderate Islamist Party Ennahda to power. (Natter, 2015)

|	May 05-May 06	May 06-May 07	May 08-May 09	May 09-May 10	May 11-May 12
Emigration flows	31180	23130	26660	23730	50930

Figure 5: Emigration flows from Tunisia, 2005/2006 – 2011/2012 (Ragab *et al.*, 2013, p. 8).

[37]

The revolution led to an immediate surge in irregular emigration of Tunisians and third state nationals to Europe. Several reasons can be identified. The security void after the revolution led to the effective absence of Tunisian border controls in early 2011 (Natter, 2015). Also, as a consequence of the political instability, the Tunisian economy, especially the tourism industry, suffered a dramatic setback. In 2011, unemployment even increased to 18.3 % according to World Bank (2016b) data. In early 2011, Italian authorities recorded the arrival of 28'000 Tunisians at it sea borders, compared to an annual average of 1'700 over the 2000-10 period (Natter). Looking at Figure 5, the sharp increase of emigration in the aftermath of the revolution becomes visible.

However, since the rise in 2011, irregular migration from Tunisia has decreased again. In 2012, 2'200 Tunisian irregular migrants were intercepted at European sea borders; the number dropped to less than 1'000 in 2013 and 2014. According to Natter (2015) "this is partly due to the restoration of border controls by Tunisian authorities and increased EU financial and technical support, but also to Libya's increased role as a departure point for irregular migration." Meanwhile, more than 18'000 Tunisians were forcibly returned from Europe between 2011 and 2014 (Frontex, 2015, p. 65). In 2013, with more than 10 %, Tunisia has had the third highest rate of refusal of Schengen visa[23] (Frontex, 2014, p. 18).

3.2.3. Remittances

From early on, it was one of the goals of Tunisia's emigration policy to attract remittances. Workers were encouraged to emigrate and transfer money home. In the mid-1980s, the country relaxed currency exchange controls and allowed expatriates to open bank accounts in convertible Tunisian dinars, in order to attract further investments. (Natter, 2015)

As can be seen in Figure 6, remittances have played a significant role in Tunisia's economy over the past decades, annually accounting for at least 3 % of the GDP. In 2010, remittances sent to Tunisia for the first time passed the 2 Billion USD mark (World Bank, 2011, S. 30). In 2015, Tunisia received 2.3 Billion USD in remittances, already 4.8 % of its GDP (KNOMAD, 2016, p. 49). In its 2013 national strategy on migration, Tunisia aimed to increase remittances to 10 % of its GDP by 2020 (Natter, 2015).

[23] Only surpassed by Iran and Algeria (Frontex, 2014, p. 18).

Figure 6: Annual Officially Recorded Remittances to Tunisia, 1976 – 2013 (Natter, 2015).

3.2.4. Tunisian Diaspora

In 1988 the *Office des Tunisiens à l'Etranger* (OTE, Office of Tunisians Abroad) was created with the general mission of providing the Tunisian government with the elements and data to implement a policy of oversight and assistance for Tunisians living abroad. The self-declared mission of the OTE is "to ensure the promotion and implementation of oversight of Tunisians living abroad", to provide assistance to them, to strengthen the cultural attachment of Tunisian children living abroad to their homeland and to "facilitate insertion of emigrant Tunisians returning to Tunisia into the national economy". (Office of Tunisians Abroad (OTE), 2013)

According to Natter (2015), with the creation of the OTE, Tunisia was "among the early adopters of diaspora engagement policies." The OTE has progressively expanded its activities to support Tunisian emigrants by "providing legal and logistical assistance to citizens and relatives abroad, cultural programs to sustain and deepen the attachment with Tunisia, information and facilitation for saving and investing in Tunisia, and support for reintegration after return." Among other things, the organization has launched a national television program targeting the diaspora, financed Arabic language classes for second-generation migrants and organized special events to familiarize Tunisian emigrant businessmen with the country's investment opportunities. However, the OTE is more than just a diaspora network. Especially under Ben Ali, it was also used to control and monitor the Tunisians abroad.

The radical increase in civil liberties after the revolution has boosted the Tunisian civil society. This has also shown effects in the diaspora. Several new Tunisian migration associations emerged, often with the goal to demand more rights for Tunisian migrants. (Natter, 2015)

Notable examples are *Centre de Tunis pour la Migration et l'Asile* (CETUMA, Tunisian Centre for Migration and Asylum) or the Tunisian Association for the Defense of Tunisians abroad (ADTE) (Migration Policy Centre (MPC), 2013, p. 10).

The post-revolution regime in Tunisia and the OTE have adapted to the new environment (SDC, 2013, p. 15). In order to integrate the diaspora better in the national politics, Tunisians living abroad were granted the right to vote and to stand as candidates in national elections. A new national strategy on migration was formulated. It emphasizes the cultural, political and economic contribution the Tunisian diaspora makes to the socio-economic development and the democratic transition of Tunisia, as well as the protection of human rights of migrants. Strengthening the contribution of the Tunisian diaspora to local, regional and national development is an important element of the new migration strategy. In order to achieve that, Tunisia wants to focus increasingly on decentralized cooperation with diaspora organizations, simplify the bureaucratic procedures and facilitate the transfer of funds, among other things. (Ministère des Affaires Sociales de la République Tunisienne, 2015, pp. 7, 15-17, 22-23)

3.3. Migration and Tunisian diaspora in Switzerland

According to the OTE (2012, p. 1), 16'667 Tunisians were living in Switzerland in 2012, which would represent roughly 1 % of the Tunisian migrant population. It would be the fifth or even fourth-largest[24] Tunisian diaspora in Europe. However, this number is more than twice as large as the number of permanent Tunisian residents in 2012[25] according to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (*Bundesamt für Statistik*, BFS, 2016). According to this statistic, 7'253 Tunisians were permanently residing in Switzerland in 2014, which represented "only" 0.36 % of the foreign population. However, according to Fibbi *et al.* (2014, p. 6), "their perception in the population is disproportionately strong".

Before having a closer look at the migration of Tunisians to Switzerland and the TDS, it should be mentioned that the following information is based mainly on official statistics. Therefore, sans-papiers are not or only partly included and it has to be assumed that the real number of Tunisians living in Switzerland is larger. Experts assess the number of sans-papiers under the Maghrebi people to be fewer than 10 % (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, p. 85). It is important that the Tunisian community in Switzerland does not only consist of the about 7'000 Tunisian nationals living in Switzerland according to official statistics but also of the undocumented residents.

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[24] This uncertainty results from the OTE's (2012, p. 1) statistic, which lists Belgium and Luxemburg as one country.
[25] 6'892 Tunisians were permanently residing in Switzerland in 2012 according to the BFS (2016). This difference results from the fact that the OTE statistic also includes people of Tunisian origin with Swiss or dual nationality, while Swiss statistics do not count them as foreigners.

Additionally, Swiss nationals with Tunisian roots should also be considered when talked about the TDS. Between 1992 and 2010 for example, 4'013 Tunisians obtained Swiss citizenship (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, p. 58). The same applies, if a person with Tunisian origin but nationality of another country, for example France, migrates to Switzerland. Furthermore, children from mixed-nationality marriages should also be considered. As mentioned, there are no strict definitions or criteria for who is member of a diaspora and it depends mainly on a person's self-chosen identity. But surely the belonging to the Tunisian diaspora does not strictly coincide with the lines drawn by nationality. Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014, p. 25) found out that many in Switzerland living people of Tunisian origin feel actually belonging to both countries (and also to other countries they might have lived in). For all this reasons, it does not make sense to apply strict criteria to delimit who belongs to TDS. The potential number of members is therefore probably much over 17'000.

### 3.3.1. Tunisian migration to Switzerland

Figure 7: Evolution of the Tunisian immigration to Switzerland by gender (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, p. 12).

Since the 1950s, people from Maghrebi countries were living in Switzerland, although only in small numbers. From the 1980s on, the Maghrebi presence in Switzerland increased, after many European countries, but not Switzerland, introduced common visa requirements. After Switzerland followed with own visa requirements in 1991, a brief flattening of the immigration of Tunisians is noticeable. Overall however, the Tunisian population living in Switzerland has increased by the factor 3.7 since the 1980s, as can be seen in Figure 7. According to Fibbi *et al.* (2014, p. 145), it is to be expected that migration from Tunisia and other Maghrebi countries to

Switzerland will continue to grow, mostly due to the demographic change happening in those countries and their inability to provide enough jobs for its young population. (Fibbi *et al.*, pp. 38-41, 145)


Figure 8: Reason for entry in Switzerland, Tunisia 2002 – 2010 (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, p. 53).

The pattern of Tunisians migrating to Switzerland has changed over the years. In the 1980s, mainly students and people looking for work were migrating to Switzerland. Although there were some dissidents, until 2008, demands for asylum were rather rare. Nowadays, Tunisian migrants originate more often from poorer regions and their exodus is mostly motivated by economic reasons. Only about 2 % of the Tunisians living in Switzerland came with a work permit; one out of six with a student's permit. More than half of the Tunisians came by family reunification, as can be seen in Figure 8. Whereas, in 2002, 10.4 % of the Tunisians migrated to Switzerland as recognized refugees, this number decreased strongly in the second half of the last decade. (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, pp. 30, 35, 53, 55)

The number of Tunisian requests for asylum was more or less stable during the 2000s. However, the mass exodus after the Tunisian revolution in 2011 had considerable effects on the asylum requests in Switzerland, as can be seen in Figure 9. In 2011, 2'574 Tunisians applied for asylum in Switzerland, an increase of 619 %, putting Tunisia on the second rank of the countries of origin regarding asylum requests (BFM, 2012, p. 19). This number remained high and most of the requests appeared to be unjustified, what caused the Swiss government to adopt an accelerated asylum procedure for Tunisians (BFM, 2014, p. 40; BFM, 2012, p. 19). In 2014, 733 Tunisians requested asylum, which is a strong decrease after the peak in 2011, but Tunisia still was on the seventh place of all countries of origins (SEM, 2015b, p. 22). According to Swiss authorities, most

of the Tunisian asylum seekers have left their country because of the lack of socio-economic perspectives and can therefore not be classified as refugees, in the strict sense (BFM, 2012, p. 19). Between 2006 and 2012, the recognition rate of Tunisian asylum applications has sunk dramatically from over 50 % to 0.2 %, as can be seen in Figure 10 (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, pp. 83-84).


**Figure 9: Asylum applications from the central Maghreb, 1986 – 2011 (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, p. 55).**

Figure 10: Recognition rate of Asylum applications from the central Maghreb, 1996 – 2012 (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, p. 84).

3.3.2. Swiss migration policy towards Tunisians

In 1963, Switzerland has removed the visa requirement for Tunisians. There were some programs to recruit Tunisian workers for agriculture and construction, but not on a large scale. In 1991, visa requirements were reintroduced. Since then, entry to Switzerland for work purposes is reserved for qualified professionals. (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, pp. 36-39)

In 2012, Switzerland signed a migration partnership with Tunisia. This agreement consists of joint initiatives and projects in different areas of migration: supporting return to home country, forceful repatriation and reintegration; combat against irregular migration and exchange of young professionals. (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, p. 39; Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA), 2015)

3.3.3. Tunisian diaspora in Switzerland (TDS)

This chapter gives an overview of the TDS and its socio-demographic characteristics. The main purpose of this is to be able to analyze the TDS and to evaluate its potential as a development actor. The chapter is based on two diaspora studies from 2014, one carried out by the former Swiss Federal Office for Migration on the Maghrebi[26] diaspora in Switzerland (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014) and another by the *Communauté Tunisienne Résidente en Suisse pour le Développement* (CTRS, Tunisian Community Residing in Switzerland)[27] (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014).

The information obtained from the first study is based on official statistics, but also includes some qualitative dimensions. It focuses on people who are member of the Tunisian community in the narrower sense, meaning that they are not Swiss nationals. As mentioned, a diaspora is not strictly defined by nationality and the picture might fundamentally change, if a more extensive concept is applied and all people with Tunisian origin are included. The second study tries to meet this requirement by addressing "Tunisians, Tunisian-Swiss or people of Tunisian origin residing in Switzerland and being at least 18 years old". It includes a survey and is also explicitly investigating diaspora engagement. However, it might not be a representative presentation of the Tunisian community, due to a relatively small sample size of 192. (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, pp. 7, 9)

For clarity reasons, this chapter uses the term *Tunisians*, whenever it refers to persons living in Switzerland, who have the Tunisian and not the Swiss nationality. People of Tunisian origin, who live in Switzerland and also have the Swiss nationality, are referred to as *people of Tunisian origin*. In a few cases, no detailed data is available for Tunisians and data for the whole Maghrebi population in Switzerland is used instead.

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[26] Here referring to the people of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.
[27] More on CTRS in chapter 4.1.

Figure 11: Age pyramid of the permanently in Switzerland living Tunisian population, 2010 (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, p. 45).

In 2010, 63 % of the Tunisians living in Switzerland were male and 37 % were female. Most of them were between 25 and 39 years old, as can be seen in Figure 11. 20 % of the Tunisians living in Switzerland were born there. 59 % of the Tunisians are married, which indicates that they are mostly living in a solid social environment with family responsibilities. Out of this group, more than half of the male and one third of the female Tunisians are married to a Swiss national. This amount lies much higher than in other foreign population groups[28], which might indicate a relatively high level of integration. (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, pp. 35, 44, 46-47)

The Tunisians are primarily living in the Romandy, the French-speaking parts of Switzerland (56 %), mainly in the two cantons Geneva and Vaud (43 %). Furthermore, there are concentrations of Tunisians in the most important urban cantons of the German-speaking parts. The concentration in the Romandy can mainly be explained by the language, since most Tunisians are French-speakers. Most Tunisians have good knowledge of the local language of their host area, especially if it is French, which is for 86 % of the Tunisians the principal language in Switzerland. (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, pp. 36, 59, 116) The people of Tunisian origin seem to be mostly multilingual. Besides Arabic and French, many of them also speak English and/or German, especially if they have worked in the tourism sectore before migrating to Switzerland. (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, p. 22)

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[28] Only 17 % of the male and 22.5 % of the female third state population, respectively 18.5 % of the male and 13 % of the female EU population living in Switzerland is married to a Swiss nationals (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, p. 47).

According to Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014, pp. 13, 20-21), there is no detailed information available on the level of education or the employment situation of people of Tunisian origin. However, most of them seem content with their employment situation and their income in Switzerland, although a few with lesser professional qualifications complain about difficulties to enter the job market. This is important since the capability to send remittances and invest in Tunisia depends on the disposable income of the TDS. It seems that generally speaking, Tunisians have a similar level of education as the Swiss population. The proportion of people with tertiary education is comparable in both groups, but the amount of people without school-leaving qualifications is much larger in the Tunisian group. Swiss people, on the other hand, have in most cases completed vocational education, which is less widespread among Tunisians. Unemployment rate of Tunisians is substantially higher than of Swiss people; in 2013, more than 13 % of the Tunisians in Switzerland were unemployed, compared to around 2 % of the Swiss people. 27 % of the Tunisians received social assistance in 2010, which is about twelve times higher as the rate in the Swiss population. This is attributable mainly to the large amount of Tunisians in the asylum process. (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, pp. 65-68, 73)

In 2009, 57 % of the Tunisians in Switzerland held a permanent resident permit. It appears that most of them migrated to Switzerland with the intention of settling permanently. Although they do travel to Tunisia on a regular basis – normally once or twice a year – to visit their relatives, often in connection with religious festivities or family celebrations, their social and economic point of reference continues to be Switzerland. (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, pp. 50, 129, 131-132) Also Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014, pp. 18, 40-41) note that "the idea of permanently returning to Tunisia is only weakly present" under people of Tunisian origin. 61.2 % of the surveyed intend to stay in Switzerland over the next five years, 20.7 % do not know yet what they will do and only 6 % want to return.

However, Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014, pp. 24-25, 35) also mention a strong social link of people of Tunisian origin to their country of origin and between the members of the diaspora. 98 % claim to have an exchange on a regular basis with other people of Tunisian origin and the same amount also claims that "being Tunisian is an important component of their identity." Most (65 %) people of Tunisian origin have daily (21 %) or at least weekly (44 %) exchange with their closest relatives in Tunisia.

According to Tejada & Garcia Delahaye's study (2014, pp. 5, 16), most people of Tunisian origin migrated to Switzerland in order to find better professional and educational perspectives and to regroup with their families. Other reasons were the general lack of opportunities and the political oppression in Tunisia. Most people stated, at least one of their objectives by coming to Switzerland was to "ensure an income for themselves and their families in Tunisia."

Generally speaking, the majority of people of Tunisian origin have a positive image of Switzerland, especially when it comes to the employment and educational situation, the quality of the welfare state, the infrastructure and the quality of life. On the other hand, they are often unhappy with migration laws, think tolerance towards foreigners is lacking and find it difficult to become integrated and start a business in Switzerland. (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, pp. 19-20)

In summary, it can be said that the members of the TDS are mostly well integrated in the Swiss society. This contradicts the rather negative image Tunisians have acquired over the last years, in connection with the wave of migration after the revolution (Birrer, 2014). Most of them are living in a stable social environment with family responsibilities, are well integrated in the labor market and have a level of education comparable to Swiss citizens. Furthermore, they seem to have a talent for languages; most of them are multilingual and speak English and/or German, besides the languages of their home country, Arabic and French. Most of the Tunisians have planned their stay in Switzerland as a long-term project; the idea of permanently returning to Tunisia is only weakly present. Still, their Tunisian origin is an important part of their identity and due to family and cultural reasons, the link is strong. A regular exchange between the two countries is taking place.

3.3.4. Relation to country of origin and potential for diaspora engagement

Almost all (95 %) of the surveyed people of Tunisian origin claim to be interested in the national and regional development of Tunisia, 70 % even state that this development was "very important" for them. Furthermore, 54 % think that their activities could have a positive impact on the socio-economic development of Tunisia. They see several ways how they could potentially contribute: transfer of knowledge and skills, participation in development projects, promotion of trade, creation of enterprises, the scientific and academic exchange or even by returning to Tunisia. Especially under students and young professionals, the motivation to transfer expertise to Tunisia is high. As mentioned, most people of Tunisian origin have a regular exchange with their closest relatives and they claim to talk often about the political situation in Tunisia, and sometimes also about investment opportunities and possibilities for professional and academic exchange. (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, pp. 33-35)

Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014, p. 36) identified four main ways how people of Tunisian origin are contributing to the development of their country of origin: (1) financial transfers and investments, (2) social capital and transfer of knowledge, (3) philanthropy and humanitarian aid and (4) return projects. However, it should be mentioned that these categories are not strictly distinguishable from one another. For example, a Tunisian might invest in a for-profit social

enterprise, having in mind his own possible return in a few years, and, by doing so, transmitting competences and knowledge to Tunisia. In this example, all four channels would be affected.

3.3.4.1.   *Financial transfers and investments*

According to Tunisian statistics, in 2012, Tunisians living in Switzerland have transferred 95 million Tunisian dinars[29] to Tunisia. This represents, also adjusted for inflation, an increase compared to 2010, when 76.3 million dinar[30] were transferred. (Secrétariat d'Etat aux Migrations et aux Tunisiens à l'Etranger, n.d., p. 8)

Financial transfers appear to be the most concrete way of engagement. However, quite surprisingly, the majority (56 %) of the surveyed people of Tunisian origin stated to never send any remittances to Tunisia. 19.9 % claimed to send remittances "a few times a year", 8.5 % "once a month", 7.1 % "less than once a year", 5.7 % "once a year" and 2.8 % "more than once a month". Unsurprisingly, people of Tunisian origin who have migrated for economic reasons and come from a poorer social context have the tendency to send regularly money to Tunisia. The money is mostly intended for family members who use it to cover their daily expenses. To a lesser extent, it is used to finance education or invested. (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, pp. 36-37)

According to Fibbi *et al.* (2014, pp. 129, 132-133) however, Tunisians living in Switzerland feel a „very strong sense of obligation" to their families remained behind. Many would send between 5 and 10 % of their salaries back home to support them. There is no detailed data on the remittance habits of Tunisians in Switzerland. According to a survey conducted among 1684 people of Tunisian origin living in France, Italy and Germany (in the following: TRE)[31], the most important destination for Tunisian migrants in Europe, 57.5 % send money to Tunisia; 55.6 % to their families and 45.4 % thereof on a regular basis (Bouchoucha, Fourati, & Zekri, 2011, pp. 8, 17-21). According to the results, men (64.2 %) are much more inclined to send remittances than women (29.5 %). Most of the transfers destined for the parents or siblings.[32] According to Bouchoucha *et al.* (p. 22) "financial transfers to the families are transmitted essentially by postal money order (47.6 %), through informal channels implying the support of friends or acquaintances (22.3 %)" and directly, when visiting (16.3 %). Bank transfers remained a less utilized method, only used by 9.4 % of the surveyed, probably "due to the relatively high costs in comparison with the other channels." 30.9 % perceive these charges as "very high" and another 47 % as "high". Furthermore, 65.9 % "stated that they would send money more often if the

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[29] An equivalent of about 57 million CHF at that time (XE, 2016).
[30] An equivalent of about 54 million CHF at that time (XE, 2016).
[31] People of Tunisian origin residing in Europe (TRE).
[32] 71.6 % send money to their mother, 56.2 % to their father and 41.5 % to siblings (Bouchoucha *et al.*, 2011, p. 21).

charges were lower." Also the Maghrebi people in Switzerland surveyed by Fibbi *et al.* (p. 132) show similar habits, claiming to mostly using informal channels and handing over money personally when visiting. As reason they mentioned a "lack of trust in the banking system of their country of origin" and "unsatisfactory experiences with business processing".

Also in the study conducted by Bouchoucha *et al.* (2011, pp. 22-23) it appears that the majority of remittances are used to cover their daily expenses. In 2011, 87.8 % of TRE providing remittances over the last 12 months claim them to be destined to daily necessities. Furthermore, 35.2 % have sent money for religious celebrations, 34.6 % to cover health expenses, 22.6 % for building, renewing or purchasing of accommodation, 18.5 % to pay for weddings and 14.5 % to pay for children's education. Only 2.1 % claim to have sent money for business activities. The authors identify a "strong dependence on remittances by the families of interviewed migrants."

Here again it must be reminded that Fibbi *et al.* (2014) focus just on Tunisian nationals, while Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014) and Bouchoucha *et al.* (2011) look, more general, at people of Tunisian origin. This latter group is more diverse, some of its members were born in Switzerland/other European countries or have obtained Swiss/a European nationality for many years, so, *ceteris paribus*, it can be assumed that they are less inclined to send money to relatives in Tunisia.

Besides sending money, Bouchoucha *et al.* (2011, p. 21) have identified other ways TRE are supporting their families back home. 33.1 % stated to purchase clothes for them, 17.8 % have paid them medical treatment, 7 % have purchased real estate for the family and 4.5 % have purchased a vehicle.

According to Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014, p. 37), less than a third (27 %) of the people of Tunisian origin living in Switzerland claim to have invested in Tunisia since they have left. Similar seems to be true for the rest of Europe. According to Bouchoucha *et al.* (2011, p. 24), TRE have invested only little in their country of origin. Only 11.8 % of the interviewed affirmed having invested in Tunisia. However, almost half (45 %) of the surveyed TRE claim to intend to invest in Tunisia at some point, mostly in their own region of origin. Bouchoucha *et al.* (p. 26) assume "that the Tunisian revolution has had an immediate effect on the perceptions of TRE and their relation with the country of origin, particularly with regard to their intention to invest and participate in the country's development." Directly after the revolution, people seem to have been very optimistic about a positive effect on investment opportunities. However, the difficult transition and the ongoing instability in the region might have brought them back down to

reality. Also Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (p. 43) come to a similar conclusion: political reasons, such as repression and instability, structural barriers and socio-economic obstacles, such as corruption, bureaucratic impediments or lacking assistance in setting up businesses have seriously hampered investment in Tunisia and have in some case led to the failure or abandonment of the enterprise.

Being asked about their reticence about investing in Tunisia, most TRE (58.8 %) claim that it is difficult to access the necessary information. 35.8 % also mention the complexity of the administrative procedures, 33.4 % the ignorance of Tunisian legislation and 30.2 % the lack of useful relations and contacts as a reason for their reluctance. "This reticence is based mainly on negative investment experience of the migrant's family in Tunisia (37 %) or close acquaintances among [other] TRE (30.2 %)." (Bouchoucha *et al.*, p. 27)

Three types of investment made by people of Tunisian origin were identified by Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014, pp. 37, 44): buying land for agriculture or infrastructure, building a house and starting a business. The goal of the investment is either to ensure appropriate living conditions for the family members or preparing for a possible return. In most cases, the money is invested in the capital, Tunis. Although they have faced severe difficulties and the investment in many cases was a failure, many people of Tunisian origin highlight the importance of their experience and professional skills acquired in Switzerland, as well as their family links as a key factor for their enterprise.

3.3.4.2.   *Social capital and transfer of knowledge*

As mentioned, the transfer of social capital (social remittances) can have an important impact on development. According to Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014, pp. 38-39), people of Tunisian origin have introduced new competences and knowledge into Tunisia, both at a social and at a professional level. The contacts and experiences gained in Switzerland and other countries strengthen their position in the Tunisian society. They use the knowledge and competences acquired in their host country to introduce new ideas into Tunisia, create businesses or improve their management. Some are active in the academic communities and have organized academic cooperation. According to Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (p. 39), researchers of Tunisian origin connect their willingness to contribute to the development in Tunisia to their scientific activities in Switzerland, from which the Tunisian society can benefit.

There is no detailed information on the social capital transferred by Tunisians or people of Tunisian origin from Switzerland to Tunisia. Bouchoucha *et al.* (2011, p. 23) interviewed TRE about their social influence in their country of origin. 21.4 % of the interviewed "declared they envisaged supporting the migration project of one or more close relatives or friends." 66.5 % thereof "declared they intended to help them find employment". 29.6 % "affirmed that their

migration experience had an impact on their family in Tunisia (apart from the improvement of living standards), notably in the desire to study and succeed following the example of the migrant.[33]

3.3.4.3.   Philanthropy, humanitarian aid and social engagement

People of Tunisian origin, individually or organized in associations, are committed to help Tunisia's development via a broad range of philanthropic activities and humanitarian aid. In the community, active donators for development projects in Tunisia could be identified, a strong feeling of solidarity towards their underprivileged compatriots was revealed. Their donations are primarily destined for supporting underprivileged communities. Those charitable actions have the capacity to directly influence the daily life of vulnerable persons. (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, p. 40)

People of Tunisian origin seem to be active members of the Swiss civil society. 62 % of the surveyed persons are member of at least one social, cultural or political organization in Switzerland (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, p. 23). However, this might be deceptive, since the socially engaged people were probably also more prone to answer to the survey.

Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014, pp. 27-28) mention 14 individual associations related to the TDS.[34] Almost all of them are based in the French-speaking part of Switzerland, only little activity was found in the German-speaking part. Most of these associations were founded recently, after the revolution. Also in the case of Switzerland, it appears that the revolution has been a wake-up call for the TDS and their engagement, especially in human rights affairs. Awareness of the brutal oppression by the Ben Ali Regime during the revolution, combined with new-won civil liberties, has led to this explosion of civil society activities.

The associations have different fields of activity; some are active in the human rights sector, some intend to build or strengthen the bonds between the communities, others want to support new arrivals, others again have a cultural interest. Some want to promote professional and scientific exchange, others have economic interest, like promoting investment in Tunisia and some are trying to promote development directly. Some development associations, like

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[33] They also "have the impression that their families have become more materialistic, developing a tendency to imitate certain foreign cultural practices, increasingly using a foreign language and adopting new dress codes" (Bouchoucha *et al.*, 2011, p. 23).

[34] Association Attanmiya, Forum des compétences tunisiennes à l'étranger (FCTE), Maison de l'Orient, Association des fonctionnaires internationaux tunisiens (AFIT), L'association des Tunisiens UNiversitaires En Suisse (Tunes), Swiss Tunisian Think Tank (STTT), Pro Ettadhamen, Equilibre, Association des compétences tunisiennes à l'étranger (ACTE), Communauté Tunisienne de Suisse (CTS), Ezzitouna, Fondation Tuniso-Suisse d'Aide Humanitaire, Association des Tunisiens et des Tunisiennes en Suisse (ATTS), Association coopération Suisse-Tunisie pour le développement durable (CSTDD) (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, p. 27).

Attanmiya, are supported by the SDC. Most of the surveyed associations stated that they are hoping for funding by the SDC. (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, pp. 29-31)

The development projects of these associations are very diverse and some of them try to cover niches which are ignored by other development actors, which can make their contribution very valuable. However, as Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014, p. 31) recognize, most of the mentioned TDS associations are still in their infancy.

According to Fibbi *et al.* (2014, pp. 118, 129, 135-137), local development projects originating from Tunisians in Switzerland are rather rare. They identify some examples in the education sector. They confirm that the socio-political commitment of Tunisians was limited for many years, mostly for fear of reprisals. The Ben Ali Regime managed to exercise considerable control on the diaspora. The Arab uprisings have generated enthusiasm among the Maghrebi community in Switzerland. The people appear to be more interested now in the occurrences in their countries of origin. It seems to have reinforced their sense of togetherness and their solidarity for their fellow countrymen. This has probably positive effects on the social engagement. Tunisians have become more aware of the socio-political events in their country of origin, are more optimistic and more willing to actively contribute to an improvement of the situation. Dissidents who have found refuge in Switzerland can lead the way for the diaspora to intensify its engagement, since they have more experience in the organization of associations. Some organizations, like for example the *Association des Tunisiens et des Tunisiennes en Suisse* (Associations of Tunisians in Switzerland, ATTS), have almost two decades of experience working for human rights in Tunisia and in the cooperation with international organizations (Fédéeration des Tunisiens pour une Citoyenneté des Deux Rives (FTCR), 2013).

According to Amor Ben Hamida[35] (2016), founder of the development association Swissvision, the greatest challenges for local development projects lie in "the lack of flexibility and initiative" in Tunisia, especially in dealing with public authorities. Bureaucratic procedures are very slow. Also, Ben Hamida criticises the lack of responsiveness of the local Tunisian community. His experience regarding the acceptance of diaspora members in Tunisia was mixed: while "some appreciate the contribution", others think "living in Switzerland makes it easy to raise funds".

Additionally, there are several associations founded by TDS with no direct link to the promotion of development in Tunisia. However, indirectly they can also have a positive effect on the development engagement of the TDS, for example by enhancing their skills, by creating awareness for the problems of the TDS or simply by bringing the community together and so

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[35] Ben Hamida was born in Tunisia and raised in Switzerland (Ben Hamida, 2015, p. 5).

building a basis for exchange. This can result in social remittances or even in the creation of concrete projects. Every commitment has the potential to have a positive impact, even if it is just aimed at the community in Switzerland.

Fibbi *et al.* (2014, pp. 114, 120) identify different areas where Tunisian associations are active in Switzerland. One is the organization of events and rallies to ensure visibility of the TDS in the Swiss society and create awareness for its problems. Another area is socio-cultural and includes the organization of religious festivities or social events, like common meals. Furthermore, there are educational activities, like Arabic-[36] or IT-courses for young people.

3.3.4.4.   Return projects

The return of a migrant is usually considered to have a positive effect on the development of his country of origin. As mentioned, circular migration or return has the potential for increased knowledge exchange. Migrants might benefit from studying and working abroad and bring their acquired skills and also new values and ideals back to their country of origin. If migrants want to return at some point does mainly depend on their perception of the relative opportunities offered in their host country and their country of origin. The decision-making progress is similar as the one the migrant went true when deciding to migrate in the first place. Just like the decision to migrate, the decision to return can be seen as a function of the interaction of push and pull factors and intervening obstacles. It has to be assumed that as a condition for a migrant wanting to return, at least some of these factors or the way they affect his situation (or his perception thereof) must have changed over time.

For the TDS, this does not seem to be the case. As mentioned, it appears that most people of Tunisian origin have little intention to permanently return to Tunisia at some point. Most of them migrated to Switzerland with the intention of staying there. Only 6 % of the surveyed intend to return in the next five years. The main reason for people of Tunisian origin to consider returning is their family ties. Some of the interviewed stated that they intend to postpone their return to Tunisia until their children have finished their studies in Switzerland, since they value the Swiss education system. Generally speaking, the future projects of the people of Tunisian origin are based on a combination of individual, economic, professional and family factors. (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, pp. 50, 129, 131-132; Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, pp. 18, 40-41)

3.3.4.5.   Potential for diaspora engagement

In this section, the TDS is analyzed for their present development contribution and the potential for cooperation with the SDC. As mentioned before, the TDS seems to be well integrated in Switzerland. It disposes of a broad range of qualifications and a stock of people with higher

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[36] The Tunisian embassy has been organizing Arabic courses for its young citizens living in Switzerland since 1978 (Fibbi *et al.*, 2014, p. 115).

education who are professionally fully integrated in the Swiss society. Besides a high level of education, they show a talent for languages. Clearly, most members of the TDS consider Switzerland the center of their life and show little intention of changing that in the foreseeable future. Most Tunisians show little intention to permanently return to Tunisia. Therefore it cannot be expected that a lot of brain circulation will result from Tunisians returning to their country of origin. However, the members of the TDS have a strong cultural and social link to their country of origin and show a strong sense of responsibility towards their families back home. Especially since the revolution, they seem to be very interested in and aware of the social, political and economic changes in their country of origin and motivated to contribute to the political transition and the socio-economic development of Tunisia. However, it remains to be seen, if this initial enthusiasm endures and creates a long-term motivation. In any case, especially the combination of being well integrated in the host country but having a strong connection to the country of origin makes the TDS a promising actor for development cooperation.

Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014, p. 45) identified several factors which encourage or restrict the commitment of people of Tunisian origin to contribute to the development of Tunisia, be it by investing, the creation of a business, or other projects:

Encouraging factors:	Restricting factors:
Emotional attachment with Tunisia	Political instability in Tunisia
Strong family links and support	Lack of responsiveness of local Tunisian community
Skills and expertise of the diaspora	Difficulties to find qualified local staff
Social and professional integration in Switzerland	Limited financial recourses for diaspora initiatives
Students and young professionals are open to opportunities	Lack of confidence in Tunisian public institutions
Geographic proximity between Switzerland and Tunisia	Lack of support by Tunisian and Swiss government for diaspora initiatives
Renowned quality of the Swiss education and training system	Vulnerability linked to residence permit in Switzerland
Well established scientific community in Switzerland	Unfavorable investment and business climate in Tunisia
Associative and community activities	Division between different diaspora associations
Skills, networks and social capital developed in Switzerland and other European countries	Difficulties to create business in Tunisia because of structural, socio-economic and

ready to be deployed to Tunisia	cultural barriers
Internet and social media usage	Lack of time
Dynamism, creativity and drive for innovation in Diaspora	Absence of support required to launch initiatives and projects

Table 2: Factors influencing the development commitment of people of Tunisian origin (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, p. 45).

The strong commitment toward the families in Tunisia is, among other things, reflected in the **remittances** the TDS sends back home. Especially Tunisians who have migrated for economic reasons and come from a poorer social context have the tendency to send money on a regular basis to their relatives. So it can be assumed that at least a part of the remittances reach people who are really in need and helps them to cover their daily expenses. While this can improve at least in the short term the economic situation of a recipient family, it is however questionable, how sustainable the impact on development is. According to the findings, only very little of the transferred money has been invested. Another issue with remittances can be that a large part of the money is transferred via informal channels, which harbors certain risks. Fibbi *et al.* (p. 132), as well as other scholars, identified a reluctance to use the banking system, mainly due to "a lack of trust", "unsatisfactory experiences" and "relatively high costs in comparison with other channels."

Generally, the idea of **investing** in Tunisia seems not very present among the TDS. Political uncertainty, complicated administrative procedures and the lack of relevant information on the Tunisian legislation and other barriers seem to have deterred the TDS from investing in its country of origin. If money is invested, then mainly in the capital Tunis, but not in the remote, underdeveloped areas. Although in the aftermath of the revolution many Tunisians were very optimistic about their intention to invest in their country of origin, the difficult transition and the ongoing economic crisis might have curbed their enthusiasm. However, the members of the TDS who have invested in Tunisia highlight the importance of their experience and professional skills acquired in Switzerland, as well as their family links as a key factor for their enterprise.

Due to the strong links the TDS has to Tunisia, a regular exchange between the two countries is taking place. Because of its immaterial nature, the **resulting transfer of knowledge and social capital** is difficult to quantify. Especially in scientific communities, cross border cooperation and an active exchange are taking place. Members of the TDS seem to have introduced new competences and knowledge into Tunisia, both at a social and at a professional level. Furthermore, many Tunisian migrants claim to have experienced a positive impact on their friends and family in Tunisia.

Members of the TDS are also active members of the Swiss civil society and they have created a variety of associations and **philanthropic organizations** dedicated to Tunisia's development. Also here, the revolution seems to have had an inspiring effect on the diaspora. The philanthropic projects of the TDS are very diverse and some of them try to cover niches which are ignored by other development actors. However, many of them are still in their infancy and the face several challenges in terms of capacity, coordination and means of action. Most of the organizations are small and lack financial resources, their operational capabilities are rather weak, and therefore, they are limited to micro actions which, left on their own, probably would not have a durable impact on the Tunisian society. (SDC, 2013)

Finally, it is unclear if the people in Tunisia accept the TDS or if the lack of responsiveness of the local Tunisian community to diaspora initiatives is hindering the TDS's impact on Tunisia's development (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014, pp. 38, 45). It remains to be seen if the experience gained in Switzerland strengthens the position of the members of the TDS in the Tunisian society or if they reject them as so-called "*chez nous là-bas*"[37] instead.

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[37] *Chez nous là-bas* (over there at our place) is a derogatory term commonly used in Tunisia for arrogant Tunisians who live in Europe (Ielgh, 2015).

4. SDC and diaspora engagement in Tunisia

According to a briefing paper by the SDC (2013, pp. 1-2), the Tunisian government has neglected the needs of the underprivileged interior regions, as well as the problems of a youth without prospects and opportunities, for a long time. Unemployment has been especially crippling in the interior regions and the possibilities of social advancement were nearly unattainable for a large sector of the society; two of the factors that caused the revolution and led to the quick overthrow of the Ben Ali regime. Due to the failure to drive the gradual eradication of regional poverty forward, the absence of an efficient and coordinated policy for territorial planning, the lack of vision and planning and poor regional and local governance, the results of the national development policy have fallen well short of expectations. The new Tunisian regime has pushed ahead important reforms to facilitate foreign investment and development assistance and the SDC (2013, p. 12) is optimistic about the improved cooperation.

After the revolution, the SDC (2015e) expanded its involvement in Tunisia, increasingly promoting stability and democracy. Between 2013 and 2015, the SDC's budget for bilateral development cooperation in Tunisia was raised from 4.6 to 7.7 million CHF. Additionally, the budget for humanitarian aid was raised from 160'000 to 550'000 CHF. (SDC, 2015a)

As a result of the migration partnership with Tunisia, the SDC and other federal agencies launched several new projects in the area of migration, for example to support the return and reintegration of irregular migrants. The program CTRS is dedicated to support the inclusion of development actors from the TDS and their socio-economic development projects for their country of origin, particularly in underprivileged regions (SDC, 2015d). The CTRS project is integrated in other initiatives in the realm of migration and development supported by the Swiss government, such as AMEDIP (Strengthening African and Middle Eastern Diaspora Policy through South-South Exchange) and JMDI (Joint Migration and Development Initiative) (Swiss Conferation, 2015). In the following chapter, the CTRS is presented in detail.

4.1. Communauté Tunisienne Résidente en Suisse pour le Développement (CTRS)

The project *Communauté Tunisienne Résidente en Suisse pour le Développement* (CTRS, Tunisian Community Residing in Switzerland for development) was launched by the SDC in 2013 with a budget of 3.5 Million CHF. It is to be completed by the end of 2018. The CTRS can be seen as a loose umbrella organization of the diverse associations of the TDS with an interest in the promotion of development. Its overall goal is that Tunisia can benefit more from "the financial investments and social capital of migrants living abroad." (SDC, 2016) The TDS, in cooperation with the SDC and the Tunisian government and its institutions, is meant to complement and

expand institutional development cooperation, which should lead to synergy effects (Rüst, Présentation de projet, 2014, pp. 5-7).

To achieve this, partnerships with the civil society and the private sector, as well as intensified interactions with the TDS, were striven. The TDS's refreshed motivation to commit to Tunisia's development in the new political context is tried to be capitalized. The concrete aims of the project are (1) to create an improved support framework for Tunisians abroad and enhanced coordination of government institutions with a mandate for Tunisians abroad; (2) to increasingly implicate the TDS in the socio-economic development of Tunisia, benefitting from better interactions with civil society and entrepreneurs of both countries; (3) to improve the channeling of the skills of the TDS through an exchange platform and cooperation initiatives; and (4) to enable Tunisian young professionals to acquire skills in Switzerland to be used for socio-economic development in Tunisia. (SDC, 2016) As a first step, a mapping study in collaboration with the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne (EPFL) analyzed the TDS and its experiences in and prospects of contributing to the development of Tunisia (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, 2014). The section for international cooperation in the Swiss embassy in Tunis is responsible for the local coordination and implication of the project (SDC, 2013, p. 19). To achieve the mentioned goals, several actions are taken, which are described on the following pages.

4.1.1. Institutional cooperation

A better coordination of the cooperation with the diverse Tunisian institutions is an important first step for the CTRS project and essential for a better implication of diaspora initiatives. Many members of the TDS stated that the inefficient bureaucracy and the absence of necessary information have kept them from investing in their home country. CTRS intends to assist the Tunisian authorities in the creation of the structures necessary to become a better partner for diaspora initiatives and investment projects. (CTRS, 2015b) The goal is to achieve a close collaboration between Tunisian institutions and the associations of the diaspora in Switzerland, representatives of the Tunisian civil society and potential or existing initiators of development initiatives, such as ONGs or other public or private actors (companies, universities, unions, etc.) (CTRS, 2015d).

CTRS cooperates with several Tunisian ministries, such as the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Vocational Training and Employment, the Ministry of Development, Investment and International Cooperation and the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining (Swiss Conferation, 2015). The SDC (2013, p. 15) wants to further improve this cooperation and try to achieve a better coordination between the different entities and the TDS, in order to eliminate all conflicts of competence and avoid overlaps of responsibility. Together

with the Tunisian authorities, CTRS supported the creation of a "one stop shop" operated by the OTE for the concerns of the Tunisians abroad, so they can find the necessary information for diverse dealings with the authorities at one place[38]. This should contribute to the elimination of conflicts of competence between the different Tunisian authorities. (SDC, 2013, p. 15)

4.1.2. Initiatives for development

According to the SDC (2013, p. 13), the Tunisian society is very well represented in its diaspora in Switzerland. The large diversity implies both risks and opportunities. Its associations face the same challenges as their counterparts in Tunisia in terms of capacity, coordination and means of action. They lack coordination and consultation, which is an important task for the CTRS.

An exchange mechanism between the CTRS, the civil society, entrepreneurs of both countries and the Tunisian institutions was put in place in order to take advantage of the know-how and the resources of these actors for the socio-economic development of Tunisia. This should contribute to the creation of synergies and help to coordinate and channel the individual activities so they reflect the shared interest of the CTRS. (SDC, 2013, pp. 15-16) Partners like the Tunisian-Swiss chamber of commerce and industry or ACIM[39] were identified and brought in contact with members of the TDS, particularly with (social) entrepreneurs (Allani, 2014, p. 6). The Tunisian-Swiss chamber of commerce and industry committed to support TDS projects by giving advice on legal matters, act as business consultants for commercial, administrative, industrial and financial aspects and giving support in taxation and custom issues (Khoudja, 2014, p. 6).

4.1.3. Transfer of competences

On a voluntary basis, members of the TDS lead short term missions to bring technical assistance to public and private development actors in the priority regions of Tunisia. This way, these actors can benefit from the provision of knowledge and expertise of Tunisian professionals residing in Switzerland. This project should lead to a regular exchange between professionals and academics of both countries. An online platform shall be put into operation in order to facilitate the transfer of competences and knowledge from the TDS supporting the socio-economic development of Tunisia. (CTRS, 2015g; SDC, 2013, pp. 16-17; Allani, 2014, p. 8)

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[38] The website www.bledi.gov.tn serves as starting point (SDC, 2013, p. 14).

[39] *Agence pour la Coopération Internationale et le développement locale en Méditerranée (*Agency for international cooperation and local development in the Mediterranean, ACIM) is a development agency based in Marseilles.

4.1.4. Agreement on exchange of young professionals

An agreement on the exchange of young professionals was signed and ratified by Switzerland and Tunisia and has entered into force on August 17, 2014. It addresses young people of both countries who want to deepen their competences and professional experience in an internship in the partner country. They can benefit from a simplified procedure to obtain a temporary residence and work permit. (CTRS, 2015c)

An exchange program is arranged in order to enable young Tunisian or Swiss professionals to do internships and gain practical experience in private and public entities of the other country. The available candidates must be between 18 and 35 years old and have completed their vocational training or their university education. For each program, up to a 150 people can participate in the exchange per year. The exchange has a duration of twelve months and can be extended for another six months. (SDC, 2013, p. 17) After their return to Tunisia, these young people should be able to contribute with their newly gained experience to the development of Tunisia (CTRS, 2015f).

4.1.5. Micro projects

As a result of the efforts made by the CTRS and its members and contributions of its civil and institutional partners, several micro projects could be called into existence. The CTRS supports suitable micro projects for a period between six and nine months financially and operationally. This support can be renewed when the project has proven to have met its objectives. In 2014, the CTRS had 60'000 CHF available to support micro projects. A project could receive up to 12'000 CHF. (CTRS, 2014, pp. 1, 3)

There are several criteria for the selection of the projects supported by the CTRS. The associations in charge need to have a link to the Tunisian community living in Switzerland. They need to have their legal personality in Switzerland and financial autonomy. Furthermore, they need to have institutional partners or associates in Tunisia. They must have an apolitical and non-religious character. The projects should be non-profit and contribute sustainably to the socio-economic development of Tunisia on national or regional level. Special attention is given to initiatives aimed at underdeveloped areas of Tunisia and projects involving women. (Allani, 2014, p. 7; CTRS, 2014, p. 1)

In 2014, as a result of an initial call for projects, three associations of the TDS were selected for support: Tunisiens UNiversitaires En Suisse (TUNES), Swiss Tunisian Think Tank (STTT) and Communauté Tunisienne en Suisse (CTS) (CTRS, 2015e).

The project "Web for Innovation"[40] by **TUNES** focuses on the internet as a force for innovation and cooperation. It aims to provide an intensive training course to a dozen of young Tunisian engineer students, mainly from underprivileged regions. On the platform, Tunisians residing in Switzerland can transfer competences and exchange ideas with their compatriots in Tunisia. (CTRS, 2015e)

The project "Forum des métiers" (Job Forum) by **STTT** is created to inform school children about the range of careers and possibilities available to them. Youth psychologists and specialists for educational and career guidance organize the forum, which takes place on five days during the school holidays. It should help to bring new perspectives to underprivileged families. (CTRS, 2015e)

The project "From University to Market (FUTuRE)"[41] by **CTS** aims to help young graduates from underprivileged regions to gain a foothold as entrepreneurs. FUTuRE intents to match selected candidates with Tunisian mentors residing in Switzerland. Based on concrete projects and involving the TDS, the young graduates shall develop entrepreneurial skills and put them into practice in their home region. (CTRS, 2015e) Several business plans have already been submitted, most of the projects have an agricultural or dietary character, like the cultivation of figs or the production of spirulina (Communauté Tunisienne en Suisse (CTS), n.d.).

In 2015, a second call for micro projects led to the signing of three new financing agreements between CTRS and the associations Ez-zeitouna, Le Pont Genève and Swissvision. The projects "Web for Innovation" by TUNES and "Forum des métiers" by STTT were rated as successful and could benefit from a renewal of the agreement and new financial support. (CTRS, 2016, pp. 1-2)

In partnership with the local association Oxygène, **Ez-zeitouna** intends to contribute to the efforts to rehabilitate two public primary schools in the Gàbes Governorate, in order to make them a "favorable space for learning and teaching" (CTRS, 2016, p. 1).

The project "Tri et recyclage dans la zone prioritaire de Menzel Bourguiba" (Sorting and recycling in the priority zone of Menzel Bourguiba) by **Le Pont Genève** intents to actively involve the citizens in the protection of the environment and wants to integrate the businesses of collecting, sorting and recycling waste in the local economy (CTRS, 2016, p. 1).

The diaspora aid organization **Swissvision** was funded by Amor Ben Hamida and intents, among other things, to reduce the school drop-out rates by supporting families in need (Swissvision,

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[40] www.web4innovation.ch
[41] www.association-cts.ch/future

n.d.). The CTRS supports the project "Vocational training in the region Médenine/Zarzis"[42] which will give twelve young men and women the possibility to complete an apprenticeship as hairdresser, baker or tailor (CTRS, 2016, p. 1). Ben Hamida (2016) is satisfied with the financial support by the CTRS. However, he criticizes the lengthy and complicated application procedure, resulting in a considerable amount of paperwork.

4.2. Analysis and recommendations

In this chapter, the SDC's strategy and actions to engage the TDS are analyzed. The chapter takes a closer look at the different channels relevant to the development of Tunisia, what the SDC has done to activate them and what could be done to improve the engagement further.

After the Tunisian revolution, the SDC started to enhance its commitment in Tunisia and tried to include the TDS increasingly. Since the idea of permanently returning to Tunisia is only little present among the TDS, the SDC decided to target members with their center of life in Switzerland, and chose its strategy accordingly, under the inclusion of members of the TDS (Rüst, Masterarbeit bei der DEZA - email, 2015). This resulted in the decision to mainly activate the channels of human capital transfers and philanthropic contributions. So far, there has been little investment by the TDS in Tunisia, but this channel holds great potential, if the conditions improve. The SDC has actively supported measures to achieve that. With remittances, the TDS is already making an important contribution to the development of Tunisia. However, measures could be applied in order to increase the use of formal channels and to achieve a more sustainable use of the transferred money.

In order to get to know the TDS, the SDC conducted a detailed mapping study to analyze the diaspora and its capabilities for contributing to the development of Tunisia. A regular dialogue with the TDS was established in order to create trust and transparency. The CTRS was created as an umbrella organization for the TDS with the intention of increasingly implicating the community in the socio-economic development of Tunisia, supporting their efforts and coordinating their actions between themselves and with the Tunisian government. Partners from the civil society as well as entrepreneurs and governmental institutions were brought together. A platform for an exchange between these stakeholders was called into life.

It appears that the TDS accepts the SDC as a partner and that trust could successfully be established, at least among the well-integrated elites. However, Tejada & Garcia Delahaye (2014, p. 17) identify a certain vulnerability of many Tunisians who have recently or irregularly immigrated to Switzerland due to the complicated entry and residence regulations. A simplified

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[42] http://swissvision.org/314

entry, residence and naturalization procedure could create additional trust, improve the integration of the TDS even further and encourage some members of the community to "take risks" and contribute in one way or another to the development of Tunisia, if they were guaranteed that they could always return to Switzerland. [43] While it is not in the competence of the SDC to adopt such a decision, it could certainly lobby for it, in accordance with the concept of policy change as an element of development cooperation. On the other hand, the Tunisian authorities should try to re-establish trust between them and the Tunisian diaspora (Tejada & Garcia Delahaye, p. 46). As mentioned, organizations like the OTE were also used to monitor the diaspora and might therefore be associated with the old, oppressive regime. By supporting the Tunisian government and the OTE to adapt, the SDC can also contribute to the establishment of trust between the Tunisian government and the diaspora. Furthermore, the SDC could consider to intensify its cooperation with other development agencies, such as the German GIZ or the French FDA, which are both experienced in working together with the Tunisian diaspora.

As mentioned, the TDS makes an important contribution to the development of Tunisia by sending **remittances**. However, the money often flows through informal channels, which harbors considerable risks, and is rarely invested. Bad experiences and high costs are some of the reasons why the TDS is reluctant to use the banking system for sending money. By creating or supporting a rating system for financial services, the SDC could help increasing the transparency and competition in this sector, making it more efficient, what could encourage the TDS to increasingly use formal channels. Furthermore, incentives like tax breaks could be created for remittances which are invested productively, in order to increase the sustainability.

Five years after the revolution, Tunisia still struggles to attract foreign **investment** crucial for its economic development (Amara & Strohecker, 2015). Political uncertainty, complicated bureaucratic procedures, the absence of relevant information and bad governance have deterred the TDS from investing in Tunisia. The SDC should continue to support Tunisia in creating a more investment friendly business climate. CTRS has supported the creation of a "one stop shop" for the concerns of Tunisians abroad, which should help them to find the necessary information for investing and dealing with the authorities. Furthermore, CTRS has organized possibilities for exchange between local and diaspora entrepreneurs. With the Tunisian-Swiss chamber of commerce and industry, CTRS has engaged a valuable partner who can advise the TDS in business and investment issues. Especially for investment in peripheral and underdeveloped areas or projects crucial for development, special conditions and incentives

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[43] Although in the long run, a better integration of the TDS could lead to a decrease in remittances. However, the author assumes that the benefits of a better integrated TDS clearly outweigh that effect.

could be created. In order to reduce the risk for the diaspora investors and entrepreneurs, a cooperation with the Swiss Export Risk Insurance (SERV) could be considered. Also, diaspora investors could be supported financially, either in the form of matching funds or by providing loans at favorable rates. In cooperation with banks, special financial products for investment in sustainable development in Tunisia could be created.

As mentioned, most members of the TDS are not considering returning to their country of origin anytime soon. Therefore, not a lot of permanent **human capital transfer** can be expected. Within the framework of the migration partnership with Tunisia, the SDC could try train irregular migrants who are not allowed to stay in Switzerland. Rejected asylum seekers, for example, could be offered the possibility to complete an apprenticeship or a training in order to be better prepared for their reintegration in Tunisia and to bring new skills to their country of origin, under the condition that they will return voluntarily afterwards. Although, as the people responsible for the SDC's global program on migration and development have emphasized, its objective is not to prevent immigration, "unsuccessful" migrants could be contracted to share their experiences in Tunisia, in order to create awareness of the risks and dangers of irregular migration.

The CTRS has planned short term missions, in which members of the TDS bring technical assistance to public and private development actors in the priority regions of Tunisia, so these actors can benefit from their expertise. This should then lead to a regular exchange between professionals and academics of both countries. An exchange program for young professionals of Switzerland and Tunisia has been called into life and should boost the exchange of ideas and competences and increase the brain circulation. Instead of only offering this possibility to graduates, it should be considered to create another exchange program especially for vocational training or apprenticeships, since Tunisia is lacking a training system for apprentices, which results in the high level of unemployment among university graduates (Strahm, 2015). Intensive scientific cooperation between the two countries is already taking place. The CTRS could promote this exchange eve more, by sponsoring research projects in the area of development.

Members of the TDS have created a variety of associations and **philanthropic** organizations dedicated to Tunisia's development. Their projects are diverse and they can make valuable contributions by covering niches. Most of the organizations are rather small and unexperienced and lack financial and operational resources. Until now the CTRS has provided six diaspora micro projects with financial and operational support and helps in doing so diaspora development actors to pursue development goals more effectively. While it is too early to analyze the impact of these projects yet, it is apparent that the prefix "micro" should be emphasized, since they, left on their own, probably would not have a durable impact on the Tunisian society. However, if

successfully implemented, they can become valuable role models who can further engage the TDS. As mentioned, it is important that governmental development actors set a clear agenda and choose their partners carefully, since the objectives of private organizations may not always be aligned with those of the state agency or the target country. In the case of Tunisia, a latent threat of militant Islamism is present. The CTRS has selected its partners cautiously and has excluded associations with a political or religious character. Finally, it is striking that the CTRS is predominantly active in the French-speaking part of Switzerland. Since, after all, 44 % of the Tunisians are living outside of the Romandy, mostly in the German-speaking parts, they should not be ignored. It should be examined if the TDS is actually less engaged in these regions or if the CTRS's efforts have somewhat a bias towards the Romandy.

Tunisia, once a prime **tourism** destination in the Mediterranean, has been suffering from a severe slump after the revolution and a series of Islamist terrorist attacks. Tunisia's tourism sector accounted for over 8 % of its GDP in 2010 and is responsible for many jobs, so the current crisis is a heavy burden for the already struggling economy (Hutchinson, 2016). Members of the TDS could act as tourism ambassadors, promoting their country of origin as a safe destination worth visiting. The CTRS could actively support such actions.

5. Conclusion

Development and migration are two highly interconnected global phenomena. Many scholars and policy makers have reached the conclusion that they are somewhat two sides of the same coin, although there are different views on how the relationship works. Since the beginning of human history, people have migrated in order to improve their living conditions. However, migration does not only affect the life of the migrants, but also their families and communities, as well as their countries of origin and their host countries. The idea of diaspora engagement for development implies that migration has a potential to improve the socio-economic situation in the country of origin. Diasporas can be agents of change. Often, their goals overlap with the ones of development actors and they can support, complement or expand traditional development cooperation.

The concept of diaspora is appropriate, since it implies a community with a collective commitment to the prosperity of its country of origin. The fuzziness of the concept is desired, since it does not make sense to strictly delimit who belongs to a diaspora. The belonging does mainly depend on a person's self-chosen identity and does not strictly coincide with the lines drawn by nationality. The Tunisian diaspora is diverse and also includes many people with Tunisian roots, but a different nationality. The Tunisian diaspora is quite large; more than 10 % of the population is living abroad. Mainly due to the high unemployment rate and the lack of prospects, many Tunisians, especially young university graduates, emigrate in order to improve their living conditions and contribute to financial situation of their families. From their host countries they contribute in many ways to the socio-economic development of their country of origin. They transfer money, invest, introduce new skills and ideas in their community or found philanthropic organizations.

The TDS is well integrated in the Swiss society and disposes of a broad range of qualifications. Most members of the TDS consider Switzerland the center of their life, but their Tunisian origin is an important part of their identity. Due to family and cultural reasons, there is a strong connection and a regular exchange. Especially since the revolution in 2011, the members of the TDS seem to be very interested in and aware of the social, political and economic changes in their country of origin and motivated to contribute to the political transition and the socio-economic development of Tunisia. The combination of being well integrated in the host country but having a strong connection to the country of origin makes the TDS a promising development actor.

Governmental development actors like the SDC have recognized the immense potential of diasporas for development and have created programs in order to activate and channel the

commitment of diasporas. They intend to build capacities so that the diasporas can contribute effectively to the development of their countries of origin. In order for cooperation with a diaspora to be successful, governmental development actors need to identify their objectives, get to know the respective diaspora, build trust and create the right conditions to mobilize it. In this framework, the CTRS was created as an umbrella organization for the TDS in order to support the efforts of the diverse diaspora stakeholders and coordinate their actions between themselves and with the Tunisian government. Since the idea of permanently returning to Tunisia is rarely present among the TDS, the SDC decided to focus on members with their center of life in Switzerland.

With remittances, the TDS is making a valuable contribution to the Tunisian development. Especially Tunisians who have migrated for economic reasons and come from a poorer social context send money to their relatives on a regular basis. However, only very little of the transferred money is invested. The SDC could create special incentives for remittances which are invested productively, in order to increase the sustainability. Furthermore, the TDS is reluctant to use the banking system for sending money, due to bad experiences and high transaction costs. Many diaspora members stated that they would send money more often if the charges were lower. By creating or supporting a rating system for financial services, the SDC could help increasing the transparency and competition in this sector, making it more efficient.

So far, there has been little investment by the TDS in Tunisia, but this channel holds great potential, if the conditions improve. Political uncertainty, complicated bureaucratic procedures, the absence of relevant information and bad governance have deterred the TDS from investing in Tunisia. By supporting the Tunisian authorities, the CTRS contributes to improve Tunisia's business climate. Also, the CTRS has organized possibilities for exchange between local and diaspora entrepreneurs as well as other partners, in order to discuss investment opportunities. Additionally, special incentives could be created for investment in peripheral areas or projects crucial for development.

A regular social exchange, as well as intensive scientific cooperation, is taking place between Switzerland and Tunisia. Members of the TDS seem to have introduced new competences and knowledge into Tunisia, both at a social and at a professional level. The CTRS has organized exchange programs and short term missions, in order to boost the exchange of ideas and competences and increase the brain circulation. Additionally, it should be considered to focus increasingly on vocational training or apprenticeships.

Members of the TDS have created a variety of associations and philanthropic organizations dedicated to Tunisia's development. Their projects are diverse and they can make valuable contributions by covering niches. Most of the organizations are rather small and unexperienced

and lack financial and operational resources. The CTRS supports micro projects and helps diaspora development actors to pursue development goals more effectively. However, the mentioned projects are relatively new, operate on a small scale and might have only a limited impact on the development of Tunisia.

In conclusion, it can be said that an engaged diaspora can make a valuable contribution to the development of its country of origin. Diaspora actors know the specific conditions in their country of origin and can provide unbureaucratic, quick and efficient support. However, diaspora engagement should be seen as an integral part of development planning and not as a substitute for traditional development assistance, which it cannot and should not replace. Diaspora engagement is not a panacea; diaspora actors might lack the needed experience or the eye for the big picture, or they might have a hidden agenda. These risks should not be neglected. Also, in order for diaspora engagement to be effective, the conditions in the country of origin are at least as important as the ones in the host country. Diaspora efforts can only be effective if the basic elements of good governance are present. However, if these points are kept in mind, the factors are cautiously analyzed and the right framework is created, diaspora actors can be valuable partners for governmental development agencies.

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